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THE (F) UTILITY OF RULES: 
REGULATING ATTORNEY CONDUCT 
IN FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE 
Judith A. McMorrow * 
The nice thing about standards is that 
there are so many of them to choose from.l 
"Rules cannot determine the circumstances 
of their own application."2 
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1. This phrase has been described as an oxymoron and social proverb. It is widely 
attributed to computer science professor Andrew S. Tanenbaum. 
2. This precise articulation comes from Anthony P. Farley, Thirteen Stories, 15 
TOURO L. REV. 543, 544 (\999). For a description of the possible sources of this concept 
see Frederick Schauer, Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 IOWA L. REV. 91\,919 n.35 
(1997). 
3 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
THE problem is often decried: out-of-control attorneys, opportun-ists, cowboys, self-dealers, and overzealous prosecutors abusing the litigation process either for self-serving ends or from ideologi-
cal zeal. But one person's opportunist, cowboy, or self-dealer is another 
person's zealous advocate. Lawyers want and need guidance on how to 
resolve issues that have competing claims to right behavior. The true 
challenge for the legal profession is how to create norms of conduct to 
provide this guidance in a rapidly-changing legal culture.3 Whether 
searching for curbs on abusive conduct or reinforcing norms in close 
cases, the first cure we look to-of course-is rules. We Americans have 
a love affair with rules. Our political and legal rhetoric embraces rules as 
the public cure for public problems. Those who toil with rules, however, 
3. See Ted Schneyer, The FlIlure Structure and Regulation of Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 521 (2002) ("Although some accounts of the upheaval are exaggerated, American 
lawyers and their regulators are unquestionably confronted today with profound and de-
stabilizing changes in legal work, lawyers' workplaces, and the market for legal and law-
related services. "); Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation 10 Private Justice: Legal Practice at 
War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931 (1993); Benjamin H. Bar-
ton, An Institlllional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regula-
tion-Courts, Legislall/res, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167 (2003). Cf. Arthur R. 
Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," 
and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in COllrt and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 982 (2003) (exploring changes in civil procedure to respond to perceived litigation 
explosion). 
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know well the limits of rule-making and rule implementation.4 Rules 
have many varied and subtle forms.S All rules carry with them the inher-
ent ambiguity of language. Every rule-making context forces us to con-
sider how much, and where, discretion should be given.6 Yet the softer 
version of standards, broader statements that guide the actor, leave many 
observers skeptical of their utility.? This is particularly true with formal 
systems, such as courts, government entities, and corporations, which 
tend to gravitate toward rules.s Rules are also rather crude instruments 
to capture ethical values.9 
The federal courts have often been held up as the paradigm of a more 
coherent rules system. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal 
Procedure, and Evidence are designed to increase the probability of a 
consistent outcome across state and territorial boundaries. lO Over the 
4. See infra Section IILB. See also Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriollsly: 
Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Herme-
neutic Framework, 77 TuL. L. REV. 527 (2003); Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the 
Lawyers Point of View, 15 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 209 (2003). 
5. See infra Section I1LB. 
6. See generally Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the 
Conllndrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Legal Real-
ism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1990); George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflec-
tions About Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269,277-81 (1984). See also Anthony 
V. Alfieri, Critical Theories and Legal Ethics: Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 
(1993). 
7. See E. Norman Veazey, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key Isslles of 
Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL. L. REV. I, 4 (2002) ("Our 
objective [in Ethics 2000 revision of Model Rules of Professional Conduct) was also to 
resist the temptation to preach aspirationally about 'best practices' or professionalism con-
cepts. Valuable as the profession might find such guidance, sermonizing aboul best prac-
tices would nol have-and should not be misperceived as having-a regulatory dimension. 
There are other vehicles for accomplishing that noble objective" such as the Conference of 
Chief Justices' National Action Plan on Professionalism); Lawrence J. Fox, Setting the Pri-
orities: Ethics Over Expediency, 28 STETSON L. REV. 275 (1998) ("one of the worst things 
that ever happened to litigation ethics-no, ethics in general-was the recent emphasis on 
professionalism. Beyond good manners and avoiding temper tantrums, no one knows what 
professionalism means."); Susan R. Martyn, Professionalism: Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 
24 U. ToL. L. REV. 189 (1992) (most professionalism efforts ';conclude in hopeful exhorta-
tions but weak proposals for change"). Some philosophers use the term ;'principle" to 
distinguish broader concepts from specific, conclusive, and authoritative rules. Others fo-
cus on the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive rules. See FREDRICK SCI-lAUER, 
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 14-15 (Clarendon Press 1991) [hereinafter PLAYING BY THE 
RULES). 
8. Prof. Benjamin Barton offers a very interesting comparative analysis of the institu-
tional strengths and weaknesses of courts, legislatures and the market as regulators of at-
torney conduct. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: 
Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 1167 (2003). Prof. Barton concludes that courts have a critical weakness because they 
are too susceptible to lawyer lobbying and insufficiently accessible to the public. He con-
cludes that the least-worst alternative is a legislative body. 
9. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical De-
liberalOrs?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 932 (1996) ("whatever advantages codified black letter 
rules offer in other settings, they do not obtain when it comes to fostering ethical delibera-
tion in lawyers."). 
to. Consistency is an express goal of the Rules Enabling Act, which sets out the proce-
dure by which the rules of federal court practice are enacted. 28 U.S.c. § 2073(b) (2000) 
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last fifteen years, a new area of rule-ambiguity has emerged as federal 
courts have focused on how to regulate attorney conduct in federal court 
practice. ll The issue is well-known to observers of legal ethics in federal 
court practiceP No single set of rules govern attorney conduct (i.e. eth-
ics) in federal court practiceP Instead some federal district courts use 
the state versions of the rules in which they sit, others use the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, or the court's own detailed rules. Even if the district court has 
clearly designated which rules apply, the rules are often ignored or irrele-
vant to the question at hand. 
The seeming incoherence of federal court regulation of attorney con-
duct, at first blush, begs for a resolution through rule-making. Uniform 
rules of attorney conduct for federal court practice would, in theory, yield 
the traditional benefit of rules: consistently applied norms of attorney 
conduct throughout the federal system. Rule-making for attorney con-
duct in federal court practice, however, has been an utter failure to date, 
even as the significant procedural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s saw a 
rise in the rule-based sanctions available to federal judges.14 The 
(the standing committee of the Judicial Conference "shall review each recommendation of 
any other committees so appointed and recommend to the Judicial Conference rules of 
practice, procedure, and evidence ... as may be necessary to maintain consistency and 
otherwise promote the interest of justice"). For a provocative analysis of the concept of 
uniformity see Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, 
Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989). See also 
Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twellly·First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 533, 534 (2002); Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role 
of Rules: A Survey of Intra·State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 315-16 (2001); Carl Tobias, Some 
Realism About Federal Procedural Reform, 49 FLA. L. REV. 49, 52·3, (1997) (The Federal 
Rules "were meant to promote national uniformity while allowing district judges consider-
able discretion."). 
11. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States undertook an expansive review of local rules in the mid 1980s. See 
Daniel R. Coquillette, Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct in the Federal 
Courts (presented to the meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on 
July 5, 1995). See also Local Rules Project, Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure, Judicial Conference of the United States (1987) [hereinafter Local Rules Project) 
(analyzing current state of local rules). The subject of attorney regulation was left for 
special study, which was undertaken in 1995. This study was updated in JUDITH A. Mc-
MORROW & DANIEL R. COQUILLE1TE, FEDERAL LAW OF AT[,ORNEY CONDUCf, MOORE's 
FEDERAL PRACfICE § 802.06 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) [hereinafter FEDERAL LAW OF AT-
TORNEY CONDUCT). 
12. An excellent body of literature has analyzed the issues. See infra note 57 (articles 
analyzing no-contact rule and McDade Amendment). See also Bruce A. Green and Fred 
C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002); An-
drew L. Kaufman, Who Should Make the Rules Governing Conduct of Lawyers in Federal 
Matters, 75 TuL. L. REV. 149 (2000); Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics 
and Erie, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 89 (1995). 
13. As used in this article, ethics refers to norms of right behavior that derive from the 
professional role of the actor. Law, like many professions, has articulated rules of ethical 
conduct that are part of the norms of conduct. As described in detail, these professional 
rules are not the only source of ethical norms. 
14. As Professors Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green have observed, the momentum for 
"federal judicial regulation of attorney conduct more generally appear to have petered 
out." Green & Zacharias, supra note 12, at 387. For an analysis of the procedural reforms 
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strengthening of the sanctions available through the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure has reinforced the understanding of federal courts as an 
appropriate body to establish norms of attorney conduct. ls Yet the fed-
eral courts could not develop the needed consensus to adopt federal at-
torney conduct ethics rules, or even a decision to refer uniformly to the 
rules of the state in which the court is sitting. 
Those who maintain a national practice, lawyers who are subject to fre-
quent removal of cases from state to federal court, and the Department 
of Justice ("DOJ") are deeply concerned about the inconsistent rules. 16 
They understandingly do not like the indeterminacy and pockets of inter-
nal inconsistency inherent in the situation. 17 While indeterminacy is a 
reality for many of their clients, and typically good for business in the 
private sector, it is quite uncomfortable, particularly when it carries the 
moral censure of "ethical violation." Yet, even the politically powerful 
Department of Justice has been unable to muster the necessary political 
consensus to create uniform rules, even in the specific areas of particular 
DOJ interest. 's The DOJ has also repeatedly tried, and failed, to address 
this issue through legislation. 
Now that the initial issues have percolated through rule-making, con-
gressional, judicial and academic review, we are in a good position to step 
back and explore the dynamic that has arisen. There is utility in working 
toward coherence in ethical rules in federal court practice, but recent ex-
perience suggests that the efforts toward a rule-based system will ulti-
mately be futile. As developed in detail below, multiple cultures and 
values come together when we try to regulate attorney conduct in federal 
court practice, creating a fascinating, confusing and chimerical situation. 19 
that were intended to curb unrestrained adversarialism, Maureen N. Armour, Practice 
Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993 Amendments to Rule II, 24 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 677, 689-93 (\996). For an excellent development of the rule-based sanctions see 
GREGORY P. JOSEPHS, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (MICHIE 
2000) (1989). 
15. A plethora of procedures available to dispose of cases before trial reflected a judi-
cial attitude "increasingly hostile to the preexisting tolerant attitude toward litigants' 
claims." Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Conundrum 
of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 507 n.63 (1997). 
16. See infra Part II.B. See generally David Hricik & Jae Ellis, Disparities in Legal 
Ethical Standards Between State llnd Federal Judicial Systems: All Analysis and a Critique, 
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 577 (2000). 
17. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law ill the Regulation of Legal 
Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 75 (1997) ("Two relatively recent trends, however-the in-
creasingly multijurisdictional character of law practice and the increasingly disparate ethi-
cal norms of those jurisdictions-have conspired to put lawyers in the same uncomfortable 
position often occupied by their clients."). Prof. Moulton argues that the problems faced 
by lawyers "are no more difficult or momentous than similar problems faced much more 
often by their clients." ld. at 79. 
18. This may be due, in part, to an unstated concern about DOJ capture of the rules 
process. 
L9.Capturing the policy strands of this issue is like holding finely woven threads in 
your hand. Each thread seems to float in a different direction, some deeply woven into 
other bases. See FEDERAL LAW OF AnORNEY CONDUCT, supra note II, at * 801.02[71 
("The federal law governing attorney conduct may be a relatively narrow field of regula-
tion, but few branches of the law set out so vividly the pros and cons of fundamental 
HeinOnline -- 58 S.M.U. L. Rev. 8 2005
8 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
Federal courts have the inherent power to control the proceedings in 
their courtroom, including the long-recognized (albeit conceptually un-
clear) inherent power to regulate attorneys. In giving content to litiga-
tion ethics, judges draw on multiple sources, including the procedural 
rules, norms of practice and formal rules of professional conduct. The 
state rules of professional conduct were crafted by state supreme courts 
for regulatory use, using the model version proposed by the ABA as a 
starting point for discussion, and apply to a wide range of settings. Some 
of the norms contained in the state and Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct drew upon influential federal court decisions that crafted the norms 
through a common-law process. That common-law process has served 
the federal courts quite well. Even when citing to state Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, federal courts often tend to revert back to the common-
law approach by relying on their own body of federal case law to interpret 
the meaning of the text. 
The rules of professional conduct in use by states contribute to a com-
mon-law, contextualized, approach to regulating attorney conduct in 
court practice. The rules of professional conduct do not address many of 
the issues that arise in litigation, often contain open-textured standards, 
and fail to address the remedy for violations, leaving all of these issues to 
judicial discretion. Judges have the wide fact-finding latitude to simply 
ignore the attorney conduct issue, which is usually ancillary to the merits 
of the litigation. Rules are unlikely to constrain this broad discretion, 
particularly among judges who have a strong culture of autonomy and 
absolute belief both in their ability to regulate the conduct of attorneys 
who appear before them and, perhaps more importantly, their finely 
honed ability to exercise discretion. It is, after all, their stock in trade.2° 
The federal appeals courts functionally give little review to the exercise of 
this very broad discretion.21 
This is not to suggest that rules of professional conduct are irrelevant in 
federal court practice. An analysis of the citation patterns of federal 
courts reveals a healthy reference to either the state or Model versions of 
the rules of professional conduct. But in practice, the rules of profes-
sional conduct function like standards, serving to guide the federal courts 
but not to unduly constrain their decision-making. 
jurisdictional issues!,J including the rival claims of all three branches of federal government 
for authority, the rival claims of proactive rule making of fixed specificity against the flexi-
bility of retroactive 'common law' adjudication, and the rival claims of federal and state 
jurisdiction. "). 
20. My thanks to Rev. J. Donald Monan, S.J. for helping develop this idea. See also 
Armour, sllpra note 14, at 686 ("[dJiscretion is not an abstraction to a judge, it is part of her 
daily life. ") 
21. See infra Part III.B.4. In some circuits the written criticism of an attorney in a 
written opinion is generally not appealable once the underlying merits have been resolved. 
See infra Part III.B.3. See generally John Bell, Discretionary Decision-Making: A JlIrispru-
dential View, in TilE USES OF DISCRETION 89, 94 (Keith Hawkins, ed. 1992) ("Where ... 
the reviewing authority will make an alternative decision only in the marginal case where 
the original decision is irrational or aberrant, then the original decision-maker is less con-
trolled and has a more authoritative cxercise of power. "). 
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Federal judges do not seem too deeply concerned about the lack of 
uniform rules. The federal courts, like all courts, have informal mecha-
nisms to control attorney conduct, a point that requires much more em-
pirical research.22 In contrast, state courts, with their strong and 
historical role in regulating attorneys, care deeply about maintaining con-
trol over the rules-the formal processes-governing attorney conduct. 
States are the initial source of the right to practice law.23 This first order 
power gives state supreme courts, and the courts who report to them, a 
strong and powerful role among the multiple institutions that shape the 
legal profession.24 
Lawyers are left with the challenge of anticipating how a court will 
react to a particular ethical dilemma. There will be no perfect cure for 
the challenge inherent in a federal system. As discussed below, even if 
federal courts consistently use state rules of conduct (vertical uniformity), 
interpretive differences will arise because the norm creators in this con-
text (the state supreme courts) are not the norm enforcers. Even if fed-
eral courts create targeted uniform rules to address recurring issues in 
federal court practice (horizontal uniformity), the inherent limit of rules 
and absence of appellate review means it is unlikely there will be a na-
tional body of case law to give meaning to the rules .. What has emerged is 
a delicate, ongoing balance of competing interests that is driven by a min-
imal encroachment approach that acknowledges the state supreme 
courts' strong interest but gives room for the autonomy interests of fed-
eral courts.25 
22. See, e.g., In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 92 n.6 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Heavy-handed criti-
cism of an attorney by a judge may exact a considerable price, even when the judge does 
not formally frame the criticism as a reprimand."); W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods 
of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.c. L. REV. 967, 976 (2003) ("In the ap-
propriate case, though, a good judicial spanking may be more effective than all the profes-
sionalism conferences in the world at educating lawyers about the consequences of 
unprofessional conduct."); Paula L. Hannaford, The National Action Plan on Lawyer Con-
duct: A Role for the Judge in Improving Professionalism in the Legal System, 36 COURT 
REVIEW 36, 39 (1999) (discussing National Action Plan recommendations that judges take 
active role in promoting professionalism, notes that "[nlothing acts as a deterrent to unpro-
fessional conduct by lawyers quite as effectively as the watchful supervision of the trial 
judge."). 
23. United Mine Workers v. III. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) ("That the 
States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond question."). 
24. See Hannaford, supra note 22, at 37 (describing Conference of Chief Justice's Na-
tional Action on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism. A plan which "would require more 
judicial leadership, coordination and daily involvement to achieve significant improve-
ments in lawyer professionalism and ethical conduct"); Harold C. Clarke, The Judiciary as 
the Guardian of Professionalism, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 65, 67 
(ABA, 1997) (while reform of the legal profession in Georgia could occur through law 
schools, bar associations, law firms, courts, and individual lawyers, "only one had the 
power to invoke the interest and participation of almost all lawyers-the judiciary."). 
25. Overall, the debate over federal rules has led to "better questions, rather than new 
answers." Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the Normative core of Lawyering: Uncomfortable 
Lessons from the "Metaethics" of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY LJ. 87, 90-01 (2000) (discussing 
the nature and irony of ethical disagreement, analyzing how lawyering "is always con-
ducted within a complex combination of philosophical possibilities"). See also Douglas N. 
Frenkel, Robert L. Nelson & Austin Sarat, Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics 
and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (\998) (major assumption of research pro-
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While the effort to create rules of attorney conduct in federal court 
practice did not bear the envisioned fruit of uniform rules, it did bear 
some unintended benefits. Since 1995, when the issue was framed, fed-
eral courts have moved to embrace dynamic conformity by referring in-
creasingly to the state Rules of Professional Conduct rather than the 
Model rules. More lawyers at least know where to look for the (imper-
fect) standards that will be the starting point for the federal court's analy-
sis. The DOJ has had at least one success in going directly to a state to 
lobby for a change in the state ethics rule, indicating that the concededly 
labor intensive spot-fix can resolve some of the most critical issues. And 
there is still the possibility that in a few recurring situations the federal 
courts might be able to fill the gap with more precise rules. It is an open 
question, however, whether those targeted ethics rules might better be 
placed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Criminal Procedure. 
II. THE PROBLEM AND EFFORTS TO RESOLVE IT 
A. THE PROBLEM IN GREATER DETAIL 
Federal courts do not use a uniform set of rules to address attorney 
conduct issues. This is particularly surprising given the close affinity be-
tween ethics in the litigation context and procedure, both of which ad-
dress litigation (mis)conduct and often complement and occasionally 
supplant each other.26 The issue came into national prominence in 1995 
when a Judicial Conference study of the rules regulating attorney conduct 
in federal courts revealed seven different sources of rules that district 
courts are directed to use when evaluating attorney conduct.27 This range 
ject on study of ethical behavior and professionalism "was that neither hortatory profes-
sional ideologies nor the promulgation of rules themselves can provide reliable protections 
against both incivility and overtly unethical behavior in litigation. "). 
The analysis in this article is informed, in part, by a pilot study of interviews with judges 
to obtain a more thorough picture of how they exercise their discretion in regulating attor-
ney conduct. The pilot study is an access study of federal and state judges. Judges were 
interviewed for 45-75 minutes and asked approximately 14 questions. A fuJI description of 
the methodology, questions and human subjects' compliance can be obtained from the 
author by writing to mcmorrow@bc.edu. For an example of how interviews can be used 
see Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute Reso-
lution, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161,167 (2002) (excerpts of interviews "have been added for the 
purpose of adding context to, rather than evidence for, the arguments, which will stand or 
faJl on their own merit."). 
26. Procedural and ethics rules have sought to regulate the same corpus of litigation 
(mis)conduct, often complementing and occasionally supplanting each other. See generally 
Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11,37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 819, 823 (2004); Judith A. McMor-
row, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959 (1991); Richard H. 
Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Adversary Ethics-The Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 625, 626-29 (1982). 
27. Working Papers of the Committee on Rilles of Practice and Procedure: Special SWd-
ies of Federal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct, (Studies I, II.-A, fII, IV, V, VI, Daniel R. 
Coquillette; Studies lIB, VII, Marie Leary), Study 1 at 2-4. (Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts 1997), described in detail in FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT, 
supra note II, at § 802. 
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of approaches within the supposedly uniform federal courts occurred be-
cause district courts have the power to create local rules to supplement 
the federal rules of civil and criminal procedure.28 The Judicial Confer-
ence study was conducted by Professor Daniel R. Coquillette and re-
vealed that of the 94 district courts, 62 courts (about 64 %) used a scheme 
of dynamic conformity, directing that the district court should use the 
rules of the state in which the federal court was sitting.29 Of those courts, 
most had based their state attorney conduct rules on the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (48), but others still used some version of 
the earlier ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (12), and two 
of the federal District Courts in California used California's rules 
adopted by statute.3D Ten federal courts adopted the ABA models di-
rectly. Ten others directed their courts to use both the state standards 
and the ABA model, even though those standards might conflict.31 
Eleven district courts had no local rule at all, and the creative Northern 
District of Illinois drafted its own rules of conduct that varied in some 
respects from both the ABA models and the Illinois standards.32 District 
courts also have a common practice of issuing "standing orders" that gov-
ern common issues that arise in the court, and it is unclear whether some 
district courts have standing orders that address the issue of attorney con-
duct. The Coquillette Report noted that updating the research is ex-
tremely difficult because "the local rules picture changes monthly and it is 
very difficult for loose leaf services to remain accurate."33 Even as 
changes occur, there appears to be "no uniform trend in these changes."34 
Local rules themselves are a dynamic creature and the mosaic has 
changed somewhat since 1995. The fact of identifying the issue may have 
encouraged some courts to take action. For example, as of 2001, six more 
district courts adopted local rules, leaving only five districts without local 
rules governing attorney conduct.35 Most local rules are now available 
on-line. 
Even when the local rule is easily found, some rules are badly drafted 
or provide "ambiguous guidance. "36 More interesting is that even when 
the local rule is clear in content, the courts often give only nodding refer-
28. See Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure For the Twenty-First Century, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 537-38 (2002) (exploring local procedural proliferation). 
29. This conformity is "dynamic" because any changes in the professional conduct 
rules by the state after adoption of the local rule are automatically applicable in the federal 
court. 
30. Two of the four federal district courts in California use the unique California Rules 
of Professional Conduct, either exclusively or in connection with the ABA models. See 
FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDuer, supra note 11, at § 802. 
31. Ten use the ABA Models Rules directly, while ten use both the state standards and 
the ABA models. Id. 
32. Id. §§ 802.04, 802.05. 
33. Local Rules Project, supra note 11, at 7. 
34. hi. 
35. FEDERAL LAW OF AITORNEY OlNDLlcr, supra note II, at § 802.01. 
36. Local Rules Project, supra note II, at 2. 
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ence to the local rule when assessing lawyer conduct, or disregard it.37 As 
Chart I indicates, over the last five years, federal courts have continued to 
cite the model version of the rules of ethics in 30-40% of the cases that 
cite to the Rules of Professional Conduct.38 Since 1996, citations to the 
model rules have decreased while citations to the state version have in-
creased, indicating that the district courts are moving toward dynamic 
conformity. The continued reference to the model version of the rules 
offers at least theoretical problems because, as discussed in greater detail 
below, many states have changed the model version of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct when adopting a state ethics code based on the Model 
Rules. 
Even when a federal court cites to the state version of the ethics rule, 
they frequently go on to cite federal court cases that analyze the issue 
without regard to whether the underlying citation was interpreting the 
same text. For example, in the approximately sixty-four reported federal 
cases that refer to Rule 4.2 concerning contact with represented persons, 
two-thirds refer to the state version of the rule. Of those, well over half 
cited only federal cases to interpret the rule and 90% of the opinions rely 
on federal cases to some degree in interpreting the rule.39 While some 
courts do use the local rule to refer to the state code and cite state cases 
interpreting the relevant provision, they are the exception. With amazing 
candor, the Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected use of a local rule that 
applied a state's rules of professional conduct, concluding that the federal 
courts should evaluate motions to disqualify based on "the ethical rules 
announced by the national profession in light of the public interest and 
the litigants' rights. "40 This is arguably what is happening in other circuits 
as well, but without a similar express disclaimer of the local rule. 
37. Courts may comply with a rule of dynamic conformity by citing directly to the state 
rule without feeling a need to refer to the local rule to explain the choice of law. 
38. A more thorough analysis of this citation pattern is developed at Chart III, infra. 
39. A chart with supporting information is on file with the author. 
40. In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1992). The District Court 
looked to the local rule, which directed it to use the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Id. at 542. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the local rule was not the sole 
source of law, concluding that "its local rules alone cannot regulate the parties' rights to 
counsel of their choice" because motions to disqualify are "substantive motions." Id. at 
543. The court then went on to cite federal conflict of interest cases, the ABA Model Code 
and Model Rules, and drafts of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers. Id. at 544-45. See generally Hricik & Ellis, supra note 16. 
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CHART I 
FEDERAL COURT CITATION TO MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
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This cacophony of local rules has resulted in a scheme with no horizon-
tal uniformity--anathema to the heart of federal court rule-makers, who 
strive to have uniformity among the federal courts-at least consistent 
with the boundaries of Erie.42 Practitioners who practice in federal courts 
in multiple jurisdictions prefer horizontal uniformity. They wish to avoid 
different treatment on the same issue, depending on where the litigation 
is pending. For example, a law firm is more easily disqualified for con-
flicts of interest in the Fifth Circuit, which has applied the conflicts rules 
rigorously.43 The same firm that represents a client in the Second Circuit 
is less likely to be disqualified because of the more flexible "taint" stan-
41. This chart reflects citation patterns solely to the Model Rules and state rules that 
contain the phrase "Rules of Professional Conduct." All but six states now model their 
ethics rules after the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and four of the six use a mix of 
the Model Rules and Model Code. ABAlBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 
§ 01 (2004). We can infer that as states moved to a Model Rules format, the federal courts 
increasingly cited the state version of the Rules of Conduct, rather than the model version. 
As the chart indicates, in 1991 federal courts began citing the state version of the Rules of 
Conduct more often than the model version. 
42. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The distinction of horizontal and 
vertical uniformity is frequently made by those who analyze uniformity of ethics rules. See, 
e.g., Mullenix, supra note 12. 
43. See, e.g., In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 (5th CiT. 1992); In re Dresser Indus., 
Inc., 972 F.2d 540,541 (5th CiT. 1992). 
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dard used by that circuit.44 The Seventh Circuit appears willing to allow 
"screening" to avoid conflicts in situations that would probably not be 
tolerated in other circuits.45 
On the other hand, practitioners who are geographically based in one 
state, practicing both in state and federal courts within the state, generally 
prefer vertical uniformity under which they can be sure that the rules of 
conduct applied to them are the same whether practicing in the state 
court or the federal court across the street.46 When a lawyer takes on a 
client, the lawyer may not know whether the case will end up in state or 
federal court. Even plaintiffs, who can control the initial choice of forum, 
are vulnerable to removal. This is a significant possibility, given that be-
tween 1999-2003 anywhere from 11-20% of cases in federal court were 
lawsuits that were removed from state court.47 
Commentators on this lack of uniformity have provided a rich and val-
uable critique.48 This cacophony of approaches arose over the last 30 
years. It arguably became labeled as a "problem" when the Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference discovered 
it. But the divergent perspectives described above are not equally vocal. 
The Department of Justice is a vociferous critic of the current schema. 
The tortured history of the DOJ's efforts to bypass the limits of Model 
Rule 4.2, limiting contacts with a represented person, have been well-
developed in the literature.49 The DOl is deeply concerned that federal 
44. See, e.g., Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 748 (2d Cir. 1981) (focusing 
on impairment of the process); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136,1140 (2d Cir. 
1975) (stating that a judge has an obligation to insure that cases are not tainted by unethi-
cal conduct brought to judge's attention). 
45. See, e.g., Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1994) (screening 
allowed to avoid disqualification when attorney who previously represented plaintiff with-
drew and joined firm representing defendant). The screening cases may reflect a more 
tolerant attitude toward conflicts of interest that are reviewed after resolution of the case 
on its merits. In these circumstances, the courts are much more reluctant to require parties 
to undergo additional time and expense absent a sense that the conflict called into question 
the fairness of the result. See Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit: Holding the Line 
on Litigation Conflicts Through Federal Common Law, 16 REV. LITIG. 537, 538 (1997). 
46. See generally Hricik & Ellis, supra note 16. Prof. Hricik and Mr. Ellis provide a 
detailed analysis of how state and federal courts in Texas have strikingly different stan-
dards on several key issues, including treatment of former client conflicts, waiver of con-
flicts through delay, conflicts that arise from access to non-client confidential information, 
and representing interests adverse to current clients. See also David Hricik, Uncertainty, 
Confusion, and Despair: Ethics and Large-Firm Practice in Texas, 16 REV. LITIG. 706 
(1997). 
47. See Admin. Off. U.S. Cts., Judicial Business of The United States Courts Annual 
Report 2003, Table S-7, at 34 (2003). This significant variation in removal is due in part to 
a sharp increase in asbestos cases that were removed to federal court, many of which were 
later returned to state court. /d. at 26. See also 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.03 
(Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2000). 
48. See, e.g., Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A 
Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 473, 478-98 (1995); Mullinex, supra note 12. 
49. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 12; Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Pro-
fessiollal Condllct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rilles Be 
Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 464-67 (1996); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, 
State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and 
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prosecutors may be subject to sanction under state ethics rules for making 
contact with represented persons via undercover agents or through meet-
ings that exclude counsel.50 The DOJ has skirmished over whether state 
ethics rules can limit a federal prosecutor's ability to subpoena defense 
counsel.5 1 A more recent question has arisen concerning state regulation 
of the lawyer's ability to engage in "deceit," or direct their agents in acts 
of deceit, such as supervising undercover operations.52 These three areas 
have been the primary subject of what has been characterized as the "eth-
ics wars. "53 
The DOl's attention to these issues was ratcheted up considerably in 
1999 when Congressman Joseph McDade, angry at having been the target 
of a DOJ investigation and convinced that the prosecutors had acted un-
ethically, slipped an amendment into an appropriations bill. Known as 
the "McDade Amendment," this provision states that a government at-
torney is subject to state laws and rules and local federal rules governing 
Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 294-97 (1992); Note, Uniform Federal Rules of 
Attorney Conduct: A Flawed Proposal, III HARV. L. REV. 2063 (1998); Ryan E. Mick, 
Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Sollllion or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1251 
(2001); John H. Lim, Note, Federal Proseclllors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade 
Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080 (2000). 
Not recognizing that the review of attorney conduct rules was a subset of a much larger 
study of local rules, one student commentator has argued that the Judicial Conference 
review of attorney conduct rules is "a smokescreen masking attempts by the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) to bypass the no-contact rule." John H. Lim, Note, The Side Effects of a 
Legal Ethics Panacea: Revealing a United States' Standing Committee's Proposal to "Stand-
ardize" Ethics Rules in The Federal Courts as an Attempt to Undermine the No-Contact 
Rule, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 548 (2000). 
50. Reauthorization of the U.S. Department of Justice: Execlltive Office for u.s. Attor-
neys, Civil Division, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Execlltive Office for 
u.s. Trustees, and Office of the Solicitor General: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Congo 
35 (2001) [hereinafter Reallfhorization (Civil)] (statement of Mark Calloway, Acting Dir., 
Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice), 42 (statement of Stuart Schiffer, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of·Justice). 
51. Stern v. United States Dist. Ct., 214 F.3d 4,15,16 (1st Cir. 2000) (local rule requir-
ing judicial pre approval of subpoenas to defense counsel is not applicable to federal prose-
cutors because it interferes with federal grand jury system). 
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002). When a lawyer, or a 
lawyer's agent, engages in an undercover operation-a common prosecutorial practice-
the lawyer is engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
At least one state court decision has stated that these rules do not provide for a 
prosecutorial exception, although this conclusion was eventually softened through amend-
ment of the state's version of Rule 4.2. See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000). In Gatti the 
Oregon Supreme Court declined to accept the DOl's position that the court should create 
a prosecutorial exception. !d. at 975-76. ("[f]aithful adherence to the wording of DR 1-
102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS 9.527(4), and this court's case law does not permit recog-
nition of an exception for any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresenta-
tion, or false statements. In our view, this court should not create an exception to the rules 
by judicial decree. "). 
53. Edward C. Carter III, Limits of Judicial Power: Does The Constillltion Bar The 
Application of Some Ethics Rules To Execllfive Branch Attorneys?, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 295 
(2003); see also Nancy J. Moore, Intra Professional Warfare Between Prosecl/tors and De-
fense Attorneys: A Plea for an End 10 the Cllrrent Hostilities, 53 U. Prn. L. REV. 515 
( 1992). 
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attorneys in the state where the attorney engages in his or her duties.54 
The McDade Amendment has many technical problems-ambiguity be-
ing the primary issue-and is a burr in the side of the 001.55 When a 
local federal rule clearly designates the state rules of ethics, then at least 
the prosecutor knows where to look. But, as noted above, some local 
rules refer to both the state rules and the model rules, or adopt their own 
rules, leaving the prosecutor subject to potentially conflicting rules. The 
issues were sufficiently complex that the Department of Justice created 
the Professional Responsibility Advisory Office to answer the McDade 
questions of government attorneys and designated an ethics officer in 
each U.S. Attorney's office in the country.56 
The McDade Amendment created pockets of confusion for federal 
prosecutors primarily in the areas noted above. Members of the Justice 
Department dislike the amendment because they feel that it has a chilling 
effect on government attorneys by forcing them to constantly put their 
law licenses on the line.57 Inconsistent bar rules make it hard to deter-
mine what rule is to be followed and the different interpretations of the 
rules make it hard to determine exactly what conduct is prohibited.58 As 
a result, the DOJ has emphasized to Congress that many government at-
torneys are afraid to act in many situations for fear of losing their licenses 
to practice.59 
Given this steady cry of concern from the DOJ, an obviously powerful 
and credible actor in our federal system, it would seem that the situation 
would be ripe for swift resolution of this confusion.60 The cure would 
presumably be clear, coherent rules. But this has not happened. 
54. Citizens Protection Act ("McDade Amendment"), 28 U.s.c. § 530B (2000). See 
generally FEDERAL LAW OF ATfORNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 8LO.04; Fred C 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Proseclllors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 
215-24 (2000) (analyzing the McDade Amendment). 
55. See reauthorization (Civil), supra note 50. 
56. [d. at 42 (statement of Mark Calloway, Acting Dir. Exec. Office for U.S. Attor-
neys, U.S. Dep't of Justice). 
57. [d. at 35 (statement of Mark Calloway, Acting Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attor-
neys, U.S. Dep't of Justice), 42 (statement of Stuart Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice); Jesselyn Alicia Radack, The Big Chill: Negative 
Effects of the McDade Amendment and the Conflict between Federal Statlltes, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 707, 723 (2001). 
58. Reauthorization (Civil), supra note 50, at 35-36 (statement of Mark Calloway, Act-
ing Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice), 42 (statement of Stuart 
Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice). 
59. Eric H. Holder Jr., Ethics Rules and Federal Law Enforcement Officers, TESTI· 
MONY BEFORE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, (Mar. 24, 1999), available at 1999 WL 
182092 (F.D.CH.). 
60. As discussed later in this article, the DOrs efforts to create a more predictable 
federal court environment for their attorneys might not be achievable. See Donald C 
Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriollsly: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 OiI.-KENT. L. REV. 1569, 
1580 (2000) ("people are inclined to make sense of their environments via creative inter-
pretation, reducing the anxiety of uncertainty by imposing artificial and illusory 
coherence. "). 
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B. THE FAILED EFFORTS TO CREATE UNIFORM RULES 
OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT 
17 
After the problem was observed and recorded by the Judicial Confer-
ence in 1995, that body explored several possible reforms. Creating a 
national code of attorney conduct for all federal courts was proposed as a 
theoretical option, but it quickly stalled as overkil1.61 Even assuming that 
the federal courts would have such authority to develop a broad-based 
code, which has been seriously questioned, there simply was no apparent 
political will to do SO.62 Based on the Standing Committee's study of re-
ported cases, the most commonly litigated ethics issues in federal court 
practice involved conflicts of interest, contact with represented persons 
(Rule 4.2 problems) and advocates as witnesses.63 A great many issues 
covered by state ethics rules are simply not relevant in federal court prac-
tice.64 Taking on the formidable dragon of state chief justices to clean up 
a few loose ends seemed an unattractive use of time and ultimately ineffi-
cient because the state regulatory apparatus-whatever its flaws-is a su-
perior method of regulating attorneys, particularly for activities that 
occur outside the litigation context.65 
The next option of voluntary local rules was quickly rejected as ineffec-
tive. Only fifteen of ninety-four districts ever adopted the voluntary 
"Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement. "66 Voluntary resolution 
was unlikely to yield the desired consistency. The "do nothing" option 
was also rejected because of a concern for the "increasing balkanization," 
with little reason to think that the situation would resolve itself over 
time.67 This resistance to local rules on attorney conduct was the next 
sign that this problem may be difficult to solve. 
61. Zacharias, supra note 12. 
62. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate 
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 V AND. L. REV. 1303 (2003). 
63. FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDuer, supra note 11, at § 802.20(1). 
64. Some rules are designed primarily to protect the client, such as the duty of confi-
dentiality and much of the operation of conflict of interest. Others are designed to protect 
the integrity of the fact-finding process, such as the duty not to introduce false testimony. 
Others function more like conventions to decrease the chance of later error or misunder-
standing, such as putting certain fee agreements in writing and no commingling of client 
funds. See generally Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1216 (1994). Yet others appear designed to protect the lawyer 
(and future clients of the lawyer), such as the prohibition on limiting future practice of law. 
Many of these rule types involve issues that are of primary interest to the bar regulatory 
apparatus. For example, the duty to not commingle funds, violations of criminal law and 
general neglect are far more likely to be raised in state bar disciplinary hearings than in the 
context of litigation in federal court practice. These are rarely, if ever, brought to the 
attention of courts during litigation. 
65. FEDERAL LAW OF ArrORNEY CONDUCT, sllpra note 11, at § 802.21 [I) ("'Thus the 
'complete' national standard was both theoretically undesirable, in that it entrenched on a 
traditional area of state responsibility, and also practically undesirable. in that a 'complete' 
set of national rules covered areas of little concern to the federal courts in actual practice, 
and made reliance on state disciplinary authorities more difficult. "). (/. Barton, supra 
note 3. 
66. FEDERAL LAW OF ArrORNEY CON DULl', Sl/pra note II, at § 802.20[ I). 
67. Id. 
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The Standing Committee eventually focused on two options. First, it 
could create a local rule of "dynamic conformity" which would require 
federal courts to apply the ethics rules of the state in which they sit. The 
rule would follow the Rules Enabling Act, assuring national uniformity of 
the state preference.68 Alternatively, the rules process could create 
"core" federal rules on the most frequently litigated issues, with all re-
maining issues governed by the state rules in which the district court is 
located. The Standing Committee considered ten rules, drafted "for dis-
cussion purposes only," covering issues such as choice of law, confidenti-
ality, conflicts of interest, candor, advocate as witness and contact with 
represented persons.69 
Since the publication of the ten draft rules in 1998, the Standing Com-
mittee has not taken further action on the issue of rules of attorney con-
duct in federal court practice. Over the next four years there was rapid 
turnover in the position of DOJ's deputy attorney general, who has over-
sight over this issue.?o The Deputy Attorney General under President 
George W. Bush had just settled into office when Sept. 11th occurred, . 
which resulted in a massive refocus of DOJ energies. There did not ap-
pear to be the ability to pursue the delicate negotiations needed to bal-
ance the many competing interests reflected in the judicial conference 
rule-making process. The presence of representatives from the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices and, of course, the weight of federal judges kept the 
DOJ from exerting dispositive influence on the process.71 
While the rules process limped along, the DOJ repeatedly tried to 
overturn the McDade Amendment legislatively, with no success on that 
front either. As Assistant Attorney General Stuart Schiffer stated in tes-
timony before the House Judiciary Committee, it was hard to argue 
against a rule that says prosecutors "should act ethically in conformance 
with rules of ethics."72 At least four bills have been introduced to modify 
the McDade Amendment, each going down in defeat.?3 Even the pro-
68. 28 U.S.c. § 2072-74 (2000). 
69. FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT, supra note II, at § 802.23[3]. 
70. Since 1993, Philip B. Heyman, Jamie S. Gorelick, Seth P. Waxman, Eric H. Holder, 
Jr., Larry B. Thompson, and James B. Corney, Jr. have all served in the Deputy Attorney 
General position. See THE FEDERAL YELLOW BOOK (Summer 1993-Winter 2004). Rapid 
turnover creates knowledge gaps that can impair forward movement. Cf John J. Schroe-
der, Note, "Duet' Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of Regulatory 
Practice, Constillllional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197, 216 
(2003). This is particularly true for the rules process, where it takes approximately three 
years to generate a final rule. See FEDERAL LAW OF ArrORNEY CONDuer, supra note 11, 
at § 801.04 (describing how uniform federal rules are adopted). 
71. In the language of public choice theory, despite its powerful base the DOJ was 
unable to capture the rules process. Cf Nancy Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need 
for Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45, 89-93 (1998); 
Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the Uniform Laws Process: Some 
Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993). 
72. Realllhorization (Civil), supra note 50, at 42 (statement of Stuart Schiffer, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General. Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice). 
73. See FEDERAL LAW OF AITORNEY CONDuer, supra note II, at § 810.04[ I IIdl; Bills 
Seek to After or Undo Federal Ethics Law Governing Prosecl/lors, I No. 14 CYBERCRIME L. 
REI'. 2 (200 I). 
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investigation climate of 2002 was not enough to create sufficient support 
for DOJ efforts to overturn the McDade Amendment.74 At each turn, 
either the ABA came in to vigorously oppose the DOJ bills, or the Con-
ference of Chief Justices lobbied against them.75 
This issue makes for strange political bedfellows. Those with a strong 
belief in state autonomy and states' rights would push for the state su-
preme courts to retain the dominant role in regulating attorneys while 
those with a strong pro-prosecution perspective would presumably sup-
port the DOJ. Those concerned with undue influence of the DOJ would 
resist resolution by federal legislation because of concern for capture of 
the process. The ABA would presumably like to maintain its position as 
a dominant leader in the formation of rules of professional conduct, 
which would lead to resistance to actions that erode their position.76 
We are left in a state of limbo-with no perceptible movement in ad-
dressing the perceived problem of federal court ethics. When we look in 
greater detail at the power of federal courts and the interaction between 
federal courts and those who create norms of professional conduct, we 
can better understand why formal reform has screeched to a halt. 
III. THE FUTILITY OF RULES: THE FUNDAMENTAL 
COMMON LAW NATURE OF REGULATING ATTORNEY 
CONDUCT IN FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE 
A. WHY FEDERAL COURTS INEVIT ABLY REVERT TO A COMMON LAW 
PROCESS TO ADDRESS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
ISSUES IN FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE 
1. Inherent Power of the Federal Courts to Regulate Attorney Conduct 
The federal courts have long recognized that they have inherent power 
to regulate the conduct of those who appear before them-including the 
attorneys. This inherent power was noted early in the 1800s-long before 
we thought about ethics codes.77 The inherent powers doctrine received 
a clarifying boost in 1991 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cham-
74. Eight days after the Sept. 11,2001 attacks, two bills were introduced in the Senate 
to loosen the restrictions of the McDade Amendment. The Professional Standards for 
Government Attorneys Act of 2001, S. 1437, was introduced by Sen. Patrick Leahy and 
directed the Judicial Conference of the United States to create national rules of profes-
sional conduct in areas where state ethics rules impede federal investigations. This bill was 
sent to the Senate judiciary Committee and no further action was taken. See Professional 
Standards for Gov't Attorney Act of 2001, S. 1437, 107th Congo (2001); S. 1435, 107th 
Congo (2002). Similar provisions were included in earlier drafts of the Patriot Act and 
passed the Senate, but were removed after heavy lobbying from the ABA during the con-
ference report. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. Munigal, Anti-Contact Rille in Criminallnves-
tigations, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 16-WTR Crim. Just. 44,46 (Winter 2001). 
75. See Joy, sttpra note 73, at 46; Leslie J. Hagin, Legislation, CHAMPION, 22-Dec. 
Champion 52 (Dec. 1998). 
76. See generally Andrew L. Kaufman, Ethics 2000-Some Heretical Thoughts, 2001 
Symposium Issue of THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1. 
77. FEDERAL LAW OF ATfORNEY CONDUCT, sllpra note 11, at § 806.01 [3]; Ex parte 
Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1824). 
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bers v. Nasco.78 The Supreme Court upheld the imposition of attorneys' 
fees against the litigant under the court's inherent powers to sanction 
bad-faith conduct in litigationJ9 Chambers made clear that courts could 
use their inherent power to sanction conduct, even if that conduct was 
otherwise covered by the federal rules of civil procedure.80 While courts 
should "ordinarily" use the procedural rules, Chambers reinforced that 
the inherent powers doctrine is extremely flexible and could be wielded 
by use of the sound discretion of the district court.81 
While the Court has required bad faith before using inherent powers to 
shift attorneys fees to the opposing litigant, it is less clear whether bad 
faith is required to sanction an attorney.82 Chambers reinforced the well-
established idea that a court has the power to control admissions to the 
bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.83 The notion of 
"supervisory powers"-which functions as a special form or subset of in-
herent powers-appears to give courts greater latitude in imposing sanc-
tions on attorneys who appear before the court.84 Just as a parent is 
quick to infer attitude or intent from words or actions (who among us has 
not heard or said the phrase "Don't take that tone with me!"), courts 
more readily infer attitude and intent from attorney conduct rather than 
litigant conduct. This may largely be a semantic discussion because the 
most egregious conduct is likely to draw the strongest sanction. In these 
cases, intent can be inferred from objective manifestations of conduct, 
just as intent is inferred in both criminal law and intentional torts.85 
The federal courts have cited Chambers extensively over the past ten 
78. 501 U.S. 32,50 (1991). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 47-48. 
81. Id. at 48. 
82. See, e.g., United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000), and cases cited 
therein; In re Fisherman's Wharf Fillet, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 651, 665 (E.D. Va. 1999) (find-
ing bad faith not required for non-monetary discipline of attorney, but facts justified find-
ing of bad faith); United States v. Claros, 17 F.3d 1041,1047 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Harlan 
with approval, dicta); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating, in dicta, 
that the finding of bad faith is not required for sanctions under inherent powers; facts 
would have justified implied finding of bad faith). But see Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 1993) (requiring bad faith in disbarment sanction, quoting 
In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 389 (5th Cir. (988)). 
83. Seltzer, 227 F.2d at 44 (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. at 531) (while this power 
"ought to be exercised with great caution," it is nevertheless "incidental to all Courts."). 
84. The Court in Chambers also noted the non-fee sanctions imposed on the attorneys 
involved, including suspension and disbarment, are derived from the court's power to su-
pervise attorneys who appear before it. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43. 
85. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 (2000); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
LAW § 3.5(f) (3d ed. 2000). This greater latitude under the inherent powers doctrine to 
sanction attorneys is less clear when evaluating a federal prosecutor's conduct. See United 
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,45-47 (1992); R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Indepen-
dent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory 
Evidence, 13 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 361, 373 (2000) (critiquing Williams); This may flow 
from the practical reality that the prosecutor stands at a unique intersection of the litigant 
and attorney role. That unique blending may functionally lead courts to require a clearer 
finding of bad faith by the prosecutor before imposing sanctions under their inherent pow-
ers. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 54. 
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years.86 While Chambers is frequently cited at the end of a string of refer-
ences, it serves as the exclamation point for the idea that the federal court 
is in control. The sheer number of pages courts use to reinforce this idea 
of "we're in charge" reflects a sense that the litigation world around them 
appears to be out of control. The breadth and flexibility of the inherent 
powers doctrine is an acknowledgment that not all aspects of litigation 
misconduct can be accurately identified in advance through rule 
makingP 
It may be that, as Professors Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green argue, 
federal court authority to regulate lawyers is "a practice in search of a 
theory. "88 There are many unresolved questions about "the scope and 
nature of judicial authority."89 Lower courts have followed the Supreme 
Court's lead and have protected their core ability to regulate the conduct 
of both litigants and attorneys through a case-by-case common law ap-
proach. Federal courts have constrained their authority at the edges, lim-
iting inherent powers to regulate prosecutors before a grand jury,90 and 
disallowing use of inherent powers when it conflicts with substantive 
law,91 or imposes procedural innovations outside the rule-making pro-
cess,92 or pierces sovereign immunity.93 These are nibbles on the edges of 
the power of federal courts. 
The strengthening and clarification of the inherent powers doctrine 
emerged as commentators noted a shift in judicial function from deciding 
cases to managing them. The concept of "managerial judging" recognizes 
the shift in judicial focus from deciding cases on the merits to managing 
litigation in an era in which the vast majority of cases settle.94 With a 
managerial focus, judges become more concerned with efficiency of the 
process. Managerial judging also emphasizes the judge's wide discretion 
86. The opinion has been cited approximately 2200 times as of July 15, 2004. Approxi-
mately 90% of those citations were made with little or no discussion of Chambers. 
87. Chambers,501 U.S. at 46 ("whereas each of the other mechanisms reaches only 
certain individuals or conduct, the inherent power extends to a full range of litigation 
abuses. At the very least, the inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the intersti-
ces."); see generally Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. l331 
(2003) (cognitive jurisprudence and error in rule-making). 
88. Zacharias & Green, supra note 62, at 1303. 
89. Id. at 1307. 
90. Williams, 504 U.S. at 36. 
91. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988); United States v. 
Payner,447 U.S. 727, 727-28 (1980) (finding that courts may not invoke inherent powers to 
circumvent harmless error doctrine prescribed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). 
92. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960); Stern v. United States Dist. Ct., 214 F.3d 
4, 19 (1st Cir. 2000). 
93. United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 770 (lst Cir. 1994) (holding that despite prose-
cutor's egregious conduct, the "court's supervisory power, although potent, cannot intrude, 
unaided, into the sovereign's protected preserves."). 
94. Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in tile Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 41 (1995); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judg-
ing and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Judith Resnik, Manage-
rial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
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as a manager.95 The inherent powers doctrine is one of the many tools 
available to judges to give vigor to this management role. 
2. Filling in the Content to Create Litigation Ethics 
The inherent powers doctrine sets out the court's power, but it does not 
articulate any standards or rules. It is a jurisdictional statement, not an 
articulation of norms. Because the inherent powers doctrine is designed 
to supplement the federal rules, courts are left with a common law pro-
cess to guide them in using their inherent powers. When applied to attor-
ney conduct, the federal courts do not write on a blank slate. The 
scholarly debate over rules of attorney conduct in federal courts has often 
been framed as if the ethics rules (Rules of Professional Conduct) are the 
dominant source of norms. Ethics rules are important, but are not the 
only place to look for litigation ethics. Litigation ethics are supported by 
at least four core anchors: the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Proce-
dure and Evidence, the Rules of Professional Conduct, norms of conduct 
established by custom or practice within the bar, and expectations framed 
by the judges before whom the lawyer is appearing.96 These sources of 
norms all come together to create what can be broadly called "litigation 
ethics. "97 
Some of the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody 
clear ethical values, such as Rule 11 's prescription to bring claims well 
grounded in fact and law, or a reasonable extension of the same.98 More 
often, the Federal Rules and ethics blend when a lawyer takes action that 
falls between procedural rules but has ethical dimensions. For example, 
95. See Jonathon T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in 
Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 1003-05 (1998) (arguing that managerial decisions 
involve a more expansive discretion than purely legal decisions). 
96. Schauer, supra note 2, at 918. See generally H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 10 
(1961); PLAYING By THE RULES, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing distinction between pre-
scriptive and descriptive rules). While the rules of procedure and evidence, and the Rules 
of Professional Conduct both have more typical canonical form than norms established by 
custom, practice, or judicial expectation, these latter sources can be a potentially more 
significant source of entrenched norms than the formal rules. [d. at 72. 
97. It is interesting to note that the phrase "litigation ethics" is rarely used by federal 
courts in their published opinions. The idea is more often the focus of scholarly critique. 
See generally Mark C. Suchman, Working Witholll a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in 
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 873 (1998) (litigation ethics in corporate 
litigation "are alive, but perhaps not well"); Eric E. Jorstad, Litigation Ethics: A Niebuh-
rian View of the Adversarial System, 99 YALE L.J. 1089 (1990). 
Wonderful articles have probed whether lawyers should have different ethical con-
straints in litigation as opposed to pre-litigation (or "primary conduct") activity. See, e.g., 
Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 261 (1993); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, 
Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1190-91 (1993); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in 
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1988). The line between litigation and pre-
litigation activity is not always clear. Bundy & Elhuage, 92 MICH. L. REV. at 296; Wilkins, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1190-9\. This article assumes that standards governing pre-litigation 
conduct flow from the anticipated norms to be applied in litigation. 
98. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 
Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 01-110 ST. L.1. 1555 (2001); Judith 
A. McMorrow, Rule II and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959 (1991). 
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courts often turn to the language of ethics to evaluate what a lawyer 
should do when the lawyer accidentally receives privileged or work prod-
uct documents from the other side.99 
At least the rules of civil and criminal procedure and evidence and the 
Rules of Professional Conduct begin with a text that can be examined 
and readily ascertained, even if vague on the topics that most likely raise 
ethical issues. At this point in the discussion, two important aspects of 
the rules of procedure/evidence and the rules of conduct should be noted. 
First, both the rules of procedure/evidence and the rules of conduct have 
a variety of self-defining terms that "do little to provide ethical or moral 
guidance where it is most acutely needed. "LOO The idea of "unreasona-
ble" burdens and "undue" costs under the Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, the requirement to act with "reasona-
ble diligence," to keep the client "reasonably informed," to not charge an 
"unreasonable" fee, and the like all are areas that require judgment to 
define.lO i 
Second, the rules of procedure and rules of conduct derive from quite 
different perspectives. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence derive 
from a formal rule-making process that is controlled by the federal courts 
and Congress. 102 Although interested parties are invited to participate in 
the rule-making process, the final rules must be embraced by the judici-
ary. Ambiguities in the meaning of the rules are clarified by judges who 
are armed with a sharp understanding of the burdens and benefits of a 
broad interpretation of the rules. 103 The rules of procedure and evidence 
were created largely by judges for use in litigation. 
In contrast, the Rules of Professional Conduct are dominated by law-
yers and have been criticized for undue deference to the needs and 
desires of attorneys.104 As discussed below, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct were created as the rules for attorney discipline by the bodies 
authorized to grant or withhold the license to practice law. Federal 
judges are one step removed from this regulatory process and from a pre-
sumably more detailed understanding (than the regulators) of the under-
99. FEDERAL LAW OF A1TORNEY CONDUCT, supra note II, at § 809.03[1]. 
100. W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 896 
( 1996). 
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) (lawyer should act with reason-
able diligence and promptness); R. 1.4 (promptly inform and reasonably consul, keep client 
reasonably informed); R. 1.5 (prohibits unreasonable fee); R. 1.7 (can represent if lawyer 
reasonably believes lawyer will able to provide competent and diligent representation if 
other requirements are met), R. 3.7 (lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial at which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness). 
102. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 2072-2073 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias, Harmoniz-
ing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69,71-72 (1999) (describing how the 
rules of evidence and rules of conduct are the product of different environments). 
103. Zacharias, supra note 100. 
104. hi.; see also generally Kaufman, supra note 12; Susan R. Martyn, Professionalism: 
Behind {/ Veil of Ignora/lce, 24 U. ToL. L. REV. 1.89,189 (1992) (arguing most professional-
ism efforts "conclude in hopeful exhortations but weak proposals for change'"). 
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lying justification for each rule. Federal judges, as experts in rules, would 
of course expect attorneys to comply with the rules. But we might expect 
those judges to have a greater willingness to examine the justification for 
the rule if its application in litigation would yield a less than optimum 
result. IDS 
Norms established by custom or practice and judicial expectation are 
harder to capture and analyze. Custom or practice within the bar suggests 
the existence of legal communities that can shape conduct. The civility 
movement captures this effort to raise the level of custom and practice 
within the bar. 106 The idea of social norms has received some interesting 
attention in legal literature and the work of sociologists is increasingly 
influencing our understanding of how social norms affect legal systems. 107 
Both norms within the bar and a judge's expectation within the court-
room are obviously shaped by a host of complex influences, including 
positive law, Rules of Professional Conduct, legal culture, adversarial 
paradigm, and the like. lOS 
Judges create norms both through their interpretation of the various 
rules (procedure and ethics) and through informal actions. Judges do not 
typically question their power to use less formal mechanisms to address 
attorney conduct issues. Judges report that their first level response to 
questionable conduct-if they decide to act at all-is to talk with the law-
yer when an issue arises.109 It may begin with a simple inquiry, such as 
probing the fee arrangement with an attorney or raising a conflict issue. 
It may be manifest in pushing counsel on the merits of an issue, or calling 
counsel up for a sidebar, or dressing down the lawyer in court. These less 
formal mechanisms are not dependent on a specific rule but they can 
have powerful norm-setting effects within a courtroom. no Because the 
judge has enormous discretionary power to shape the case, the lawyers 
105. PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 7, at 73-76 (discussing layering of rules). 
106. See generally Marvin E. Aspen, A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 STETSON 
L. REV. 253 (1998). 
107. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); 
Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 38-43 
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLLIM. L. REV. 903, 914-21 
(1996); Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the 
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV 875, 894-99 (2002); Kristin 
Madison, Book Note, Gov't Signaling and Social Norms, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 867,867-72 
(200 I) (reviewing Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000». 
108. PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 7, at 102 ("many of the acts I would now not 
think of performing are acts that became unthinkable for me by a process of socialization 
that is itself substantially determined by regulative rules"). Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms 
and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 637,673 (2003) ("Competitive norms often do not re-
present an idealized product of spontaneous social ordering. They serve the interests of 
particular groups. "). 
109. See, e.g., Claudia Rickert Isom, Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON 
L. REV. 323, 324 (1998) (reporting that at Florida Conference of Circuit Court judges edu-
cational seminar, most common response to videos of unprofessional and unethical con-
duct "was to do nothing or to privately counsel the offending attorney."). 
I 10. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Critical Theories and Legal Ethics: Impoverished 
Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567,2591 (1993) (noting "the relative stability of legal discourse, 
institutions, and relations."). 
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have powerful incentive to stay on the good side of the judge. While 
some lawyers will proceed to defy and annoy the judge,lll anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that in the face of clear signals from a judge most lawyers 
will alter their behavior. 
Conspicuously absent from the list of anchors for litigation ethics is 
substantive law. Over time, some conduct that had previously been con-
ceptualized as an ethical issue has been absorbed into substantive law. 
For example, twenty years ago there was a serious ethical question about 
whether prosecutors could threaten criminal charges to obtain an advan-
tage in a civil case. In 1987, the Supreme Court issued an opinion con-
cluding that as a matter of statutory interpretation it was appropriate 
under 42 U.S.c. section 1983 to condition a dismissal of criminal charges 
on an agreement that the defendant not pursue a civil claim (known as 
"release-dismissal" agreements).l12 Once the federal courts framed the 
issue in that way, subsequent cases were much less likely to treat the 
question as an ethical issue because it had become subsumed into the 
substantive law.113 Similarly, some poignant and disturbing acts by de-
fense counsel in criminal cases are not treated as ethics issues, but sub-
sumed in the substantive question of whether the conduct meets the 
constitutional requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel. 114 A re-
lated phenomenon occurs in the development of the attorney-client privi-
lege. Federal courts are allowed to create a federal common law for 
privileges under the Federal Rules of Evidence, except where state law 
Ill. See, e.g., Interview with Federal District Court Judge: 
"I remember prosecuting a case, a very significant drug conspiracy, and with some lawyers 
from-who are well known drug lawyers. And they were antagonizing the judge to the 
point where the judge was losing his temper. They would make arguments that were just 
absurd. The judge was screaming at them and I remember talking to the lawyer at a break 
and said "Why are you doing this? This isn't going to help, the judge clearly despises you," 
and he said "when you've been in the business long enough, you'll understand it doesn't 
matter what the judge thinks it's what my client thinks. And he's happy that I'm giving the 
judge hell and he's going to tell all his friends that I gave that judge hell and I'm going to 
get a lot of business out of this." There was a very frank statement that someone made. 
They won't often be quite so obvious about it. There are times when I think people want a 
pit-bull, they want a gladiator and there are all too many lawyers who are willing to serve 
that function for them if the pay is right." [03-FD] 
112. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). See generally Michael E. 
Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretation of Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 
RUTGERS LJ. 295 (1988); Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling 
Private Rights of Action, 34 VILL. L. REV. 429 (1989); FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CON-
DUCT, supra note 11, § 813.06. 
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 3.8(a) (2002) ("The prosecutor in a crimi-
nal case shall ... refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not sup-
ported by probable cause"). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was more 
explicit, stating that "A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to 
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, DR 7-J05(A) (2004). 
As described infra § IIl(A)(3), U.S. Supreme Court cases did intluence the ethical and 
professional vision reflected in the Model Code. 
114. See FEDERAL LAW OF ArrORNEY CONDUCT, supra note II, at §§ 811.04, 813.01. 
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provides the rule of decision. I IS This provides the textual basis for the 
development of common law on the attorney-client privilege, which is 
informed, but not constrained, by the state-articulated duties of confiden-
tiality.116 Federal courts typically ignore the duty of confidentiality when 
articulating the scope of the attorney-client privilege. I 17 Once the ethical 
dimensions of the conduct have been subsumed into the substantive law, 
the state ethics codes (and the ABA models) become largely irrelevant. 
Courts typically do not undertake a formal analysis to explain why they 
are ignoring state ethics rules, but the supremacy clause would dictate 
that substantive federal law would prevail over countervailing state law. 
Any of these four sources of norms for litigation ethics-procedural! 
evidentiary rules, Rules of Professional Conduct, norms and judicial ex-
pectations-can have the label "ethics" attached, although it is most com-
monly attached to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics is a 
weighted word. Once the label "unethical" is attached, only the clearest 
countervailing ethical norm, or unequivocal law or procedural rule, will 
trump. I IS (And we would expect some linguistic hand-wringing about the 
conflict between law and ethics.) Even if there is a clear and contrary 
positive law that compels unethical conduct, common morality may push 
the lawyer to exhibit what William Simon has called "moral pluck" and 
do what is ethical. 1l9 
3. Federal Court Influence on State Ethics Rules: The Dialectic Process 
So we have a broad, inchoate inherent power to regulate the conduct of 
attorneys. The norms applied through inherent powers-"litigation eth-
ics"-emerge from multiple sources. While the Rules of Professional 
Conduct are very important, they are not the only source of norms. Even 
if we wanted the Rules of Professional Conduct to take a dominant place 
in framing litigation ethics, as currently framed, they are not up to the 
task. Because of the general standards contained in the rules, timing of 
their implementation, jurisdictional issues, and subtly different needs of 
the federal courts, the state standards are incapable of functioning with 
strong constraining force. 
115. FED. R. EVID. 501 (privilege questions in federal court "shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States 
in the light of reason and experience" except where state law provides the rule of decision). 
116. See Zacharias, supra note 100, at 71-72. 
117. These two doctrines are grounded in different policy concerns. I have no quarrels 
with keeping these concepts separate. My query is why the ethical dimensions of confiden-
tiality largely disappear when attorney client privilege issues come up, rather than serving 
as an important complementary doctrine. 
118. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 919 ("The weight of a prescription is, thus, the mea-
sure of its ability to prevail against opposing prescriptions, regardless of the source of those 
prescriptions."); Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get It": "Ethicar Jury Selection in 
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523,565-66 (1998) (arguing that ethic of zealous 
defense should trump the ideal of racially blind jury selection); Susan P. Koniak, The Law 
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1422-27 (1992). 
119. William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101 COLLIM. L. 
REV. 421 (200 I). 
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In terms of hierarchy, the ethics rules (i.e. Rules of Professional Con-
duct in most states) would be the primary rules to examine when con-
fronted with an issue of litigation ethics that is not otherwise addressed in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other substantive law. To under-
stand why the Rules have limited constraining force in federal court, we 
need to understand the development of these rules. The history of the 
efforts to set standards and rules for the legal profession is fairly recent 
and familiar to many. The 1908 Canons of Ethics was a precatory code 
drafted by the ABA and not tied to licensing requirements when initially 
drafted. 120 The Canons of Ethics were occasionally cited by federal 
courts to chide lawyers.'21 In a handful of areas, the Canons appear to 
have influenced the common law practice in federal courtS.122 
The ABA's 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility was 
promulgated and sent to the states for incorporation into the states' li-
censing scheme. The Model Code included many footnote citations to a 
plethora of ABA opinions along with multiple state and some federal 
court cases that influenced or explained the policy choices reflected in the 
Model Code. Federal cases, including Supreme Court cases interpreting 
constitutional doctrine, had an influence in the development of the Ca-
non 4 duty to preserve the confidences and secrets of a c1ient,123 the Ca-
non 5 duty to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a 
c1ient,124 the Canon 7 duty to represent a client zealously within the 
120. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2 (West 1986). The Canons 
were later adopted by some state bar associations as the basis of discipline. Id. 
121. See. e.g .. T.c. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures. Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (adopting the Canons of Ethics by Rule of Court). 
122. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Freeman, 409 F.2d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 1969) (calling them 
"code of ethics,"' opinion relies of Canons 13 and 34 to support division of fees). 
123. See Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp 917, 919 
(D.N.J. 1958) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (2002)); Baird v. 
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 4-1 (2002)). 
124. See Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Va. 1959), modified, United States 
ex rei Wilkins v. Banmiler, 205 F. Supp. 123, 128 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affd 325 F.2d 514 (3d 
Cir. 1963) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (2002)); United 
States v. Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. 11 I, 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1963 (cited in MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 (2002)); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942) 
(cited ill MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESI'ONSIBILITY EC 5-16 (2002)): State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 1967) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'I. 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-17 (2002), interpreting duty of Indiana attorney); NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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bounds of the law,l25 duties of candor to the court,126 and public criticism 
of judges. 127 
The Model Code was adopted essentially verbatim in most jurisdic-
tions. It was drafted under a comparatively more inclusive process than 
the Canons of Ethics, but was stiIl subject to criticism as reflecting a nar-
row vision of lawyering. l28 The Model Code was quickly acknowledged 
by federal courts, and as Chart II indicates, by the mid-1980s reached its 
peak of influence as the courts crafted norms of litigation conduct. Al-
though this Code was only a "model," federal courts could safely cite to 
the model and assume it reflected state versions (to the extent the court 
thought about that concern at all). TIle ABA Model Code became a 
handy reference point for the courts. The ABA proudly features its influ-
ence in this area. l29 
The Model Code's flaws were many, not least of which was the fact that 
many critical issues were not addressed by the Model Code.I3O One sig-
nificant example was the conflict of interest obligation owed to former 
clients. Because the Model Code was silent on this issue, the federal 
courts who addressed former client conflicts wrote largely on a blank 
slate. Drawing on analytical constructs developed before the Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility was even adopted by the ABA in 1969, the 
federal courts continued to do what they had done in the past when con-
fronted with issues that needed resolution. They created a common law, 
125. Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (2002»; Johns, 176 F. Supp. at 952 (cited in MODEL CODE OF PRlW'L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (2002)); Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930) (cited 
in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-2 (2002»; McCartney v. United States, 
343 F.2d 471, 472 (9th Cir. 1965) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSlBlLrfY EC7-4 
(2002»; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,744 (1967) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (2002»; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935) (cited in 
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-13 (2002»; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-33 (2002) and 
pretrial publicity); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (cited in MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-33 (2002»; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) 
(cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-33 (2002)); Marshall v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 3LO, 312-13 (1959) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 
7-33 (2002». 
126. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co. 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (DR 7-
102(B)(2) on duty to promptly reveal fraud on a tribunal committed by person other than 
the client to the tribunal); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1944); Colton v. 
United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) (on DR 7-106(B)(2) disclosure of identity of 
client). 
127. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). 
128. WOLFRAM, supra note 120, at § 2.6.2 n.21 (noting that the ABA Committee largely 
copied from 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association); see also WOLF-
RAM, supra note 118, at § 2.6.3 (describing drafting and adoption process for Model Code). 
129. The ABA has featured its role in crafting the lawyer Codes and Rules. See ABA 
Center for Professional Responsibility, at http://www.abanet.org!cpr/home.html(accessed 
August 3, 2004) ("Center has provided national leadership and vision in developing and 
interpreting standards and scholarly resources in legal ethics, professional regulation, pro-
fessionalism and client protection mechanisms"). 
130. WOLFRAM, SlIpra note 120, at § 2.6.4 (describing critiques of the 1969 Code). 
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CHART II 
FEDERAL COURT CITATION TO ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FROM 1970-2003 
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10 Citation to ABA Code I 
framing the issues largely unconstrained by formal rules. l3l Similarly, the 
Model Code failed to develop in detail the particular duties of govern-
ment attorneys, a subject which had been left to the courts to develop.132 
In other words, the Model Code did not arrive on the scene in 1969 as 
an intact body of rules applied to the federal courts, but rather as stan-
dards and rules reflecting the legal culture and informed by the federal 
court's common law and constitutional decision-making. The gaps in the 
Model Code, its express application to the disciplinary process (a subject 
discussed in greater detail below) and its often broad pronouncements 
made it function in the federal courts largely as a body of advisory 
standards. 
The ABA soon went back to the drawing board and produced and 
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. The Model 
Rules did not contain a footnote trail to indicate directly what influenced 
the various rules. We know from the content of the rules and the slender 
IJI. See T.e. Theatre Corp., 113 F. Supp. at 268-69. Although T.e. Theatre was issued 
long before the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the Model Code did not give 
specific attention to the duties owed to former clients. As a result, the federal common law 
developed from T.e. Theatre and its progeny was highly influential. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.9 (1983) (adopting the substantial relationship test of T.e. 
Theatre). 
132. T.e. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268-69. 
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legislative history that many federal court decisions were highly influen-
tial in the drafting of the Model Rules. For example, the federal cases 
setting out the "substantial relationship test" as the analytical construct 
for evaluating duties to former clients appears to be the basis for the sub-
stantial relationship test of Model Rule 1.9.133 Similarly, federal cases 
involving special conflicts of interest for former and current government 
officers and employees appear to have been highly influential in the de-
velopment of Model Rule 1.11, including the authorization of screen-
ing.134 These cases in turn were often influenced by ABA Opinions. 135 
The point is not that we can tie down a dispositive influence, but that a 
dialectic process occurred where the multiple institutional actors had va-
rying degrees of influence upon each other. 
By the mid-1980s, the federal courts were now well into the habit of 
citing the "Model" version of the ABA promulgations on attorney con-
duct. Although the Model Rules were sent to the states, the deference to 
the ABA-and consequently the perceived unity of vision-had begun to 
fray. States were much more likely to modify the Model Rules than the 
previous Model Code, with 44 states modifying the Model Rules in some 
significant respect before adopting them. 136 It appears that the longer 
states waited to revise their older code and move to a Model Rules type 
of system, the more they would revise the ABA version.137 
But citation habits had been set. Federal courts often cited to the 
model version, using the model as a guide where relevant, when develop-
ing the court's common law doctrines. The federal courts often failed to 
recognize the increasing divergence between the state and model versions 
of the attorney conduct rules. 
Meanwhile, the proliferation of local rules meant that somewhere in 
this time frame the federal district courts were likely adopting a local rule 
that identified the rules they would apply when evaluating attorney con-
duct. The local court rules that were drafted earlier are more likely to 
refer directly to the Model Code or Model Rules. 138 Later rules might 
adopt the rules of the state in which the court sits-but may not be clear 
that they are adopting "dynamic conformity" to capture revisions in the 
state rules that occur after adoption of the local rule.L39 The federal 
133. /d. 
134. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. New York City, 501 F.2d 639, 650-52 (2d Cir. 1974), 
cited in ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDuer at 91:4007; Arm-
strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 1980); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 
791,793 (CL CI. (977); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Lake County, 703 F.2d 252,255-56 (7th Cir. 
(983). 
135. See, e.g., Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 648-49 (quoting ABA Comm. On Profl Ethics 
and Grievances, Formal op. 37 (1931». 
136. Charlotte (Becky) Stretch, Overview of Ethics 2000 Commission and Report, at 
http://www.abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html) (accessed Aug. 2, 2002). 
137. See Kaufman, supra note 12, at 157. 
138. See, e.g.. Local Rules of Civ. Prac. & Proc. U.S.D. Ct. D. Del. 83.6(d)(2) (effective 
Jan. I, 1995) (refers to Model Rules). 
139. See. e.g., Local Rules of U.S.D. Ct. D.C. 83.15 (effective Sept. 1,2003) ("Violations 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct (as adopted by the District of Columbia Court of 
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courts did not have any process of periodic review and reVISIOn of any 
local rules. Consequently, for some courts the local rules became out-
dated after the Model Rules were issued. But since the local rules are so 
easily ignored, the situation was a tolerable anachronism.140 
At the same time there was a proliferation of local rules, federal courts 
also experienced a sharp increase in the other procedural tools to regu-
late attorney conduct. 141 The 1983 and 1993 revisions of Rule 11 gave 
federal courts clearer power to impose sanctions for frivolous litiga-
tion.142 This led to thousands of published federal court opinIons on what 
various courts believed constituted a position well grounded in fact or law 
(or a reasonable extension of law), giving sharper articulation of an issue 
that had rarely been addressed by state regulatory bodies. 143 The trend 
in amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to grant federal 
judges greater power to regulate attorney conduct under Rules 16 (settle-
ment), 26(g)(3) (discovery) and 37 (compliance with court orders). The 
same trend of expanded procedural rules appears in both the court of 
appeals and the Supreme Court. 144 Other statutory bases for imposing 
sanctions encourage judges to take an active role in regulating conduct. 145 
With this broad arsenal of sanctions available, ethics and professional 
conduct rules serve largely to supplement gaps in the procedural rules 
and to provide ideas and justifications for the court's imposition of its 
catch-all power: the inherent power doctrine. 
Appeals except as otherwise provided by specific Rules of this Court) by attorneys subject 
to these Rules shall be grounds for discipline, whether or not the act or omission occurred 
in the course of an attorney-client relationship"); Local Rules of U.S.D. Ct. Ma. (including 
amendments through Jan. 2,2001), 83.6(4)(b) (violation of ethical requirements and rules 
adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "as they may be amended from 
time to time by said court" constitute misconduct). 
140. The role of local rules the federal litigation system has received extensive attention 
over the last 15 years. See generally Judith Resnick, Changing Practices. Changing Rules: 
Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries. Civil Jllstice. and Civil Judging. 49 
ALA. L. REV. 133, 168-71 (1997) (describing growth in local rules); Stephen B. Burbank, 
The Rilles Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1043-98 (1982) (describing his-
tory of Rules Enabling Act). The Federal Judicial Conference became so concerned about 
the proliferation of local rules addressing all subjects that it embarked on the Local Rules 
Project. See FEDERAL LAW OF A1TORNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 801.05(4). 
141. This rise in the regulatory tools available to courts reflects the increasing regula-
tion of attorneys in the second half of the 20th century. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a 
History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-I. Origins, 8 U. Oil. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 469 (2001). 
142. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
143. See Judith A. McMorrow, Rille II and Federalizing Legal Ethics, 1991 BYU L. 
REV. 959 (1991). 
144. See Fed. R. App. P. 38 (authorizing award of costs, including attorneys fees. for 
taking frivolous appeal); Fed. R. App. P. 46(b), (c) (governing suspension, disbarment, or 
other discipline of member of bar.); S. Ct. R. 8 (governing disbarment or other discipline of 
member of bar); S. Ct. R. 42.2 (authorizing sanctions for frivolous appeal). 
145. 28 U.S.c. § 1912, 1927 (2000). 
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4. The Incompleteness of State Rules and the Remedy-Driven Federal 
Courts 
Habit was not the only impediment to adopting the state versions of 
the Model Code or Model Rules in federal court practice. Even the 
somewhat more tightly drawn Model Rules failed to address many spe-
cific problems that arise in federal court practice. 146 For example, the 
Model Rules do not tell lawyers or courts what professional relationships 
trigger a duty to avoid conflicts of interest,147 whether a disqualified law-
yer can turn over predisqualification work-product,l48 ethical dimensions 
of how to behave when the opposing side accidentally sends confidential 
documents,149 whether prosecutors have greater latitude to make contact 
with represented persons,150 and a host of other large and small 
questions. 
The Model Rules also set out provisions intended to be applied in a 
wide range of litigation and non-litigation contexts. As a result, the un-
derlying rules require contextual definition. For example, the most com-
monly-litigated ethics issue in federal court practice is conflict of interest. 
The text of Model Rule 1.7(a) states that a lawyer may not represent the 
client if "the representation of that client will be directly adverse to an-
other client" or there is a significant risk that the representation "may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, or to a 
third person, or by the lawyers own interests." 151 While the comments to 
the rule give insights into what these terms mean, they understandably 
are never formally defined. 152 Federal courts crafted standards under the 
Model Code based on common factual situations, such as suing one's own 
client, and have continued to rely on this jurisprudence to give meaning 
to ideas such as "directly adverse" and "materially limited" under the 
Rules. 153 Federal courts have had to consider the special problem of si-
multaneous representation that occurs from client mergers or acquisitions 
and from corporate affiliates and subsidiaries. 154 The courts develop 
their own jurisprudence to address these more complex factual scenarios. 
146. In other words, the divergence between the Model Rules and state versions was 
irrelevant in many circumstances because so many of the ethical issues that arise in federal 
court practice are not clearly addressed in the Model Rules or Model Code. 
147. FEDERAL LAW OF AITORNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 808.03. 
148. Id. at § 808.07. 
149. Id. at § 809.03. 
150. Id. at § 810.03. 
151. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. J.7(a)(1)-(2) (2002). 
152. See SUSAN P. SI-IAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL 
PRAcrICE 58 n.5 (University of Michigan Press 2002) ("Though adversity is the corner-
stone of conflict of interest, the ethical rules never operationally define adversity nor spec-
ify its dimensions. Instead, the rules leave to lawyer interpretation whether a 
representation will adversely affect another." Ms. Shapiro notes that the Ethics 2000 
amendments to the Model Rules reflect "a bit more on the nature of adversity than did the 
original" Model Rules.) 
153. See, e.g., Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976). 
154. FEDERAL LAW OF AITORNEY CONDUCT, supra note II, at § 808.03[4) and (5). See 
generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corpo-
rate Families, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (1997). 
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These are problems that require particularistic decision-making, with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct giving the appearance of rules but func-
tionally serving as less-constraining standards. 155 
In applying rules of conduct, the federal courts seldom struggle with 
the intent behind the rule. That analysis would require a focus on the 
drafter. Instead, courts typically focus on the value that the rule sup-
ports.156 By shifting the focus from intent, which is more akin to fact-
finding, to value exploration, the analytical process allows the decision-
maker's own assessment of the values to playa greater role. 
More importantly, the Model Rules and Model Code (and the state 
versions) are expressly silent about remedies and sanctions. Litigation is 
largely a remedy-driven system, and attorney conduct issues are particu-
larly so. In most cases, the claimed violation of ethical obligations is 
raised by opposing counsel, who is motivated to do so not just by some 
abstract desire to improve the legal profession, but rather to get a con-
crete remedy, such as disqualification of opposing counsel, limitation or 
exclusion of evidence, an order of production, reimbursement of fees, 
civil or criminal contempt, and the like. 157 The moving lawyer's motiva-
tion might be a desire to expose errant conduct to the court to set a tone 
for the litigation. It is no coincidence that the three most litigated ethical 
issues in federal court practice-conflicts of interest, contact with repre-
sented persons, and advocate-witness concerns-all offer tactical advan-
tages to the moving party if the court awards the requested remedy.l58 
The judges are obviously concerned about their institutional role in 
crafting a remedy. Since attorney conduct issues are largely derivative in 
court practice, secondary to the fair resolution of the litigants' claims, the 
federal courts appear reluctant to address attorney conduct issues unless 
they will have a consequence in the case at hand. 159 A detailed analysis 
of the reported decisions indicates that federal judges, like their state 
counterparts, are concerned with the integrity of the judicial process and 
the efficiency and fairness in the proceeding before the court. Concern 
for the integrity of the legal profession as an independent concern, at 
least as reflected in the reported decisions, plays a less dominant role. 160 
Because of the remedy-driven nature of the courts, and the federal 
court's reluctance to take on a dominant role in maintaining the integrity 
of the legal profession, the federal judges are rightly concerned that they 
155. PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 7, at 77-78. 
156. Id. at 95 (discussing the substantive justification for a rule). 
157. See generally FEDERAL LAW OF ArrORNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 808.02[21 
(describing remedies for conflicts of interest); ~ 809.06 (describing remedies given by fed-
eral courts for unethical conduct in civil discovery). 
158. Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recelll Federal Cases (/990-1995) Invo/ving Rules 
of Attorney Conduct at 2-3 (Dec. I, 1995) (presented at meeting of the Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of federal Judicial Conference). 
159. See Judith A. McMorrow. Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, Jlldicial 
Attillldes Toward Confronting Attorney Miscondllct: A View From the Reported Decisions. 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425 (2004). 
160. Id. 
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do not want ethics issues to be used for strategic advantage. 161 The inevi-
tability of strategic use of ethical rules has been well noted elsewhere. 162 
And the line between fairly raising an issue, and undue strategic advan-
tage, is very opaque. Some courts have asserted that lawyers have a duty 
to report ethical issues, such as conflict of interest, to the court. 163 But 
other courts are clearly concerned about the use of misconduct charges 
for strategic advantage. In an effort to avoid having ethics used as a liti-
gation tactic, federal courts may look to the timing of the motion to infer 
undue strategic motives,l64 to the amount of pre-trial preparation or to 
the relative wealth of the parties to infer that the motion is to harass or 
increase expenses to the opposing side. 165 Courts may also examine the 
circumstances to determine if the motion is designed to delay the pro-
ceeding or postpone judgment. 166 In the end, a court's evaluation re-
quires a delicate balancing of competing equities, including a desire not 
to lightly deprive a litigant of his or her counsel of choice. 167 At this 
point, a court is balancing a host of competing concerns that are often not 
reflected in the text of any state or model professional conduct rule, but 
are part of the mosaic of common law interpretation. 
Not only are both the Model Code and Model Rules silent on sanc-
tions, but they ostensibly sought to limit their application to the regula-
tory context. The Preamble to the 1983 Model Rules expressly states that 
the "rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are 
not designed to be a basis for civil liability."168 During the editing and 
161. See FEDERAL LAW OF AnORNEY CONDUCT, supra note II, at § 808.01[5J (setting 
out federal court concerns about strategic uses of conflicts motions). See also SHAPIRO, 
supra note 152, at 425-26 (describing strategic uses of motion to disqualify). The problem 
of strategic use of ethics rules for competitive advantage is not unique to litigation. See 
generally Linda Galler, Problems in Defining and Controlling the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 773 (2002). 
162. See Wilkins, supra note 6. 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 272 n.l (4th Cir. 1977); Estate 
Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
164. See, e.g., Kabi Pharmacia AB v. Alcon Surgical, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 957, 964 (D. Del. 
1992); Research Corp. Techs. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 936 F. Supp. 697, 701-02 (D. Ariz. 
1996); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 731 (11th Cir. 1988) (delaying in 
bringing motion basis for denial of motion to disqualify). See also Bruce A. Green, Con-
flicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 116 (1996). 
165. Research Corp., 936 F. Supp. at 701, 703 ("Disqualification can result in increased 
expenses .... "); SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (N.D. III. 
1992) ("The sanction of disqualification foists substantial costs upon innocent third par-
ties."); Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844,848 (1st Cir. 1984) ("We are aware that disqualifi-
cation motions can be tactical in nature, designed to harass opposing counsel."). 
166. See, e.g., Research Corp., 936 F. Supp. at 701 (Disqualification "can result in in-
creased expenses, delay in resolution of the proceedings and deprivation of choice of coun-
sel."); Parkinson v. Phonex Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (D. Utah 1994) (Wholesale filing 
of motions would result in "needless disruption and delay of litigation, thereby impairing 
the efficient administration of justice.") (citing Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 
(2d Cir. 1980)). 
167. See, e.g., Kevlik, 724 F.2d at 848 (strategic concerns not dispositive in evaluating 
motion to disqualify). 
168. MODEL RUI.ES OF PROF'L CONDllCT, Scope (2002). 
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public comment process for the 1983 Rules, the "Scope" discussion was 
limited at the suggestion of the New York State Bar Association to in-
clude a sentence that "nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment 
any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary conse-
quences of violating such a duty. "169 
Whatever the model version might say, the ABA could not control how 
those rules would be used. If the ABA puts its name and imprimatur 
behind the underlying standard, it is hard to justify why that standard 
should not be used, where appropriate, in court-based review of conduct, 
malpractice and the like. Once adopted by the state, the weight of the 
rules would be heavier. Without much discussion, state supreme courts 
operate as if their norms, and their leadership, should be the dominant 
voice in legal ethics. The Conference of Chief Justices has developed a 
National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism, and it is 
clear that they identify their role as preeminent. 170 The Conference of 
Chief Justices undertook the national action plan to create "a strong, co-
ordinated effort by state supreme courts to enhance their oversight of the 
profession."171 The state bars (and the ABA) see themselves as a vital 
national leader of efforts to articulate norms of conduct. And the Model 
Rules (and the state revisions) are the preeminent articulation of those 
norms. 172 
It is not surprising that the ABA revised the Scope section in the 2002 
revisions to the Model Rules, recognizing that these rules, while not ad-
dressing sanctions in related contexts like litigation, nonetheless might be 
relevant to that inquiry. The Scope section now includes a statement that 
169. ld. For the legislative history, see ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer: THEIR 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 20 (1987). 
170. Implementation Plan for the Conference of Chief Justices' National Action Plan 
on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism (adopted August 2, 2001 by the Conference of 
Chief Justices) available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/impl_plan.pdf; Resolution confirming 
adoption available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/resoIXIIILawyerConduct.html[hereinafter CCJ 
Implementation Plan]. The report grew out of a March 1997 conference on Regulatory 
Authority Over the Legal Profession and the judiciary: The Responsibility of State Su-
preme Courts, id. at 7. See also Paula L. Hannaford, The National Action Plan on Lawyer 
Conduct: A Role for the Judge in Improving Professionalism in the Legal System, 36 CT. 
REV. 36 (1999). 
171. CCJ Implementation Plan, supra note 168, at 1. 
172. The dominant ABA role is not ordained from on high and reasonable minds have 
questioned this role. When Prof. Andrew Kaufman suggested that the ABA get out of the 
business of establishing rules for attorney conduct, some of the attendees of the 27th ABA 
National Conference on Professional Responsibility were politely, but clearly, skeptical of 
his position. Kaufman, supra note 75, at 4 (giving speech upon receipt of the Michael J. 
Franck Award). For many, the ABA's role in articulating rules of conduct, and its showcase 
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, are the shining star in the ABA's crown. 
"Since 1978, the Center has provided national leadership and vision in developing and 
interpreting standards and scholarly resources in legal ethics, professional regulation, pro-
fessionalism and client protection mechanisms. Its devotion to assuring the highest stan-
dards of conduct by lawyers and judges and to enhancing the profession's role serving and 
protecting the public interest is underscored by its vigilance to meet the challenges of an 
evolving society." ABA Center for Prof'l Responsibility, Welcome Message, at http://www. 
abanet.orglcpr/home.html (Aug. 2, 2002). 
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despite the caveats about the limits of the Rules, "[n]evertheless, since 
the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's viola-
tion of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of 
conduct." 173 While hardly a claim that the Rules should be the basis for 
discipline in federal courts, it at least acknowledges that the Rules have 
relevance in other contexts. The ABA has wisely made these adjust-
ments, since few really believed that the ABA was disclaiming relevance 
of their rules in non-disciplinary contexts. Yet, states have no power to 
demand that federal courts be the enforcer of legal ethics when applica-
tion of the rules (i.e. remedy) will impede what the federal judges per-
ceive as the interests of the federal courtS.174 
The incompleteness and arguably limited scope of the Model Rules was 
one of the reasons the American Law Institute ("ALI") chose to devote 
fifteen years toward drafting a Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers. 175 The ALI intended the Restatement to address the full range of 
conduct issues, including formation of the lawyer-client relationship, the 
duty of confidentiality, work product issues, conflicts of interest, fiduciary 
and agency obligations, fees and obligations to non-clientsp6 In terms of 
relative influence, however, the Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers has not been embraced to fill the gap. As Chart III indicates, the 
federal courts cite the restatement at a significantly lower rate than the 
courts cite the state or model versions of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct. The restatement has not yet become a significant competitor with, 
or source to complement, the Rules of Professional Conduct.!77 This may 
173. The revised provision states: 
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a 
lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty 
has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily war-
rant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in 
pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers 
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agen-
cies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the 
purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing 
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a law-
yer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of 
a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral pro-
ceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Never-
theless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's 
violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of 
conduct. (Emphasis added.) 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt, Scope [20] (2002). 
174. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 118, at § 2.6 (analyzing judicial application of 
lawyer codes). 
175. RESTATEMENT THIRD, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS xxi-xxii (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Restatement]. See generally Ted Schneyer, The ALl's Restatement and the ABA's 
Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46 OKLA, L. REV. 25, 26 (1993) (While "the law of 
lawyering is in disarray, it does not necessarily follow that ALI intervention is a good 
idea."). 
176. James Podgers, Critics Fear Impact of Ethics Restatement: ALl's New Standards for 
Lawyers' Behavior Could be Basis for Malpractice Claims, 81 A.B.A. J. 34 (1995). 
177. See Schneyer, supra note 175, at 27 (expressing concern about "the potential ri-
valry between restatement and ethics codes for the attention of judges and other decision 
makers."). 
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occur because more federal courts give at least nodding recognition to the 
local rules, which typically direct them to the state rules of conduct. It 
may also be because some provisions of the Restatement either conflict 
with the prevailing rules or depart from existing case law. 178 Whatever 
the reason, it is fair to conclude that the Restatement of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers has had relatively little influence in federal court practice. 
This suggests that the Rules of Professional Conduct (both state versions 
and the model) are the most important prescriptive generalizations to 
which the federal courts give initial attention when addressing attorney 
conduct issues. 179 
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11 lil I 11 n h n I n n 
C Citation to Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
o Citation to State Rules of Professional Conduct 
• Citation to Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
o Citation to Restatement Third of law Governing Lawyers 
178. See Lawrence 1. Latto. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View 
From the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697 (1998); Richard C. Stanley, The Restatement 
of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyer Regulation Coming of Age, 48 LA. B.J. 22, 24 
(2000). 
179. PLAYING By THE RULES, supra note 7. at 77 (discussing decision-making by en-
trenched generalization). 
180. The citation pattern for the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and state 
versions of the Rules of Professional Conduct were prepared by running a search for cases 
that cited "rules of professional conduct" and a search for cases that cited "model rules of 
professional conduct"' and then subtracting the lower number of cases citing to "model 
rules" from those citing to "rules" generally. A review of the 328 cases from 1989 and 1996 
revealed only one case that did not involve the ABA code. (For those who are curious, 
there is a pharmacist's Rules of Professional Conduct.) it was impossible to duplicate this 
process in order to determine how many times the court cited to state codes of professional 
responsibility because a search for "code of professional responsibility" brought up not just 
cases that cited to the model code and the state codes but also various business and other 
codes of professional responsibility. 
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5. The Federal and State Interests and Institutional Competence 
We need to add into the mix some additional dimensions of the state 
and federal courts' interests in regulating attorney conduct. While there 
appears to be a dominant national legal culture in the United States, we 
still have state-based regulation. We could describe that state-based reg-
ulation as the archaic detritus of an older system of federalism. lSI Our 
preference for state-based regulation more likely reflects the notion that 
fine-tuning at the state and local level is an important step in thoughtful 
and effective regulation. 182 
As noted above, the Conference of Chief Justices has continuously pro-
moted its vision of the strong, dominant state role in the regulation of 
attorneys. A full development of the value of state-based regulation of 
attorneys is beyond the scope of this article. It is safe to conclude, how-
ever, that the control of the legal profession will not be wrested away 
from the state supreme courts without significant trauma. 
The federal courts' selective involvement in establishing norms of con-
duct suggests two core concerns: efficiency and integrity of the judicial 
process. The judge's dominant task is to resolve the dispute before him 
or her. Faced with burgeoning dockets and increasingly complex cases, 
judges inevitably engage in time triage.ts3 Called "task interference" in 
the language of psychology, judges allocate less time to managing attor-
ney conduct. ls4 The federal judges appear to embrace what can be called 
a minimal encroachment approach to attorney regulation. Federal judges 
typically engage in that amount of regulation minimally necessary to 
achieve their goal of efficient and fair resolution of the case at hand. 
Some judges have a more expansive view of their role, but that does not 
appear to be the dominant view. 
Sometimes federal judges will enforce an ethical norm for the benefit 
of the judicial process in general, even if the benefit does not directly flow 
to the case at hand. For example, courts-rather than litigants-are 
likely to raise a question of whether a lawyer has failed to cite directly 
adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction. lss This is a fairly precise 
rule, yet it has been addressed in over 50 published federal court opin-
ions. 1S6 In most cases, the court raises the question itself, primarily be-
cause the duty arises when counsel has failed through due diligence to 
discover authority helpful to the opposing counsel's case. (Who wants to 
181. As Prof. Benjamin H. Barton has noted, it wasn't until the late 19th century that 
state supreme courts established themselves as having inherent judicial authority to regu-
late the practice of law. See Barton, supra note 3, at 1173. 
182. The principle of subsidiarity captures this concept. 
183. See generally Tobias, supra note 10. 
184. Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 603-06 (Mar. 2003). 
18S. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002) C'A lawyer shall not ... 
knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel. "). 
186. See FEDERAL LAW OF ATrORNEY CONDUCT, sllpra note II, at § 811.02 and cases 
cited therein. 
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go before a court and say "sanction the other side for not correcting my 
sloppy or nonexistent research .... "). By the time the court raises the 
issue, the precedent has been discovered (usually by the court's own initi-
ative), so any dilution or taint on the trial process has been reduced or 
eliminated. But courts appear willing to sanction an attorney, at least 
through criticism in the written opinion, in order to send a signal both to 
the attorney involved and others. Fact-finding is de minimus because the 
written briefs offer the requisite proof. More serious sanctions for inten-
tional violation of the obligation to cite directly contrary authority are 
typically limited to cases in which the lawyer (or the lawyer's office) was 
involved in the development of the prior precedent, allowing a strong 
inference of knowledge of the precedent. ls7 
The federal courts' response to the failure to cite contrary authority 
reflects both a strong belief in the integrity of the judicial process and one 
example of the obligation of lawyers as officers of the court. It makes 
sense that federal judges want lawyers to adhere to this ethical precept 
because it increases the likelihood of an outcome consistent with the law. 
A second federal interest would likely be procedural consistency. As 
explained above, even consistent rules do not necessarily lead to consis-
tent outcomes. ISS The most common way to get greater consistency is 
through greater clarity and rigidity in the rules and a reduction of discre-
tion. And as discussed above, attorney conduct issues lend themselves to 
greater, not lesser, discretion. 
B. THE INTERPRETIVE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
1. Primary Discretion on Rules 
We are left with the fact that the translation of state rules of conduct 
into federal court practice requires judicial discretion. Judicial discretion 
is a vast and complex topic. ls9 Discretion has been the dominant norm in 
judicial control of litigation. For example, judicial discretion in Rule 11 
was not "a mere by-product of the drafting process, but rather was a fa-
vored means to achieve procedural goals. "190 Similarly, judicial discre-
tion has been a central feature of the pre-trial reforms. 191 
The application of a rule requires multiple steps that implicate discre-
tion: an analysis of what rule (or standard) applies, fact-finding to see if 
187. See, e.g., Velazquez v. Figueroa Gomez, 783 F. Supp. 31, 35 (D.P.R. 1991) (permit-
ting defense attorneys given 20 days to explain why they did not cite adverse precedent 
that lawyers had litigated); Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 625 F. Supp. 1543,1547 (D. Fla. 
1986) (analyzing DR 7-102 and Model Rule 3.3(a)(2), court imposed $500 fine; "The Court 
finds it reprehensible that plaintiffs' counsel ... omitted Bellanca and Del Percio from the 
supporting memorandum of law, especially, when he personally represented respondents 
in Del Percio. "). 
188. See infra Part III. 
189. See generally Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-33 (1977) (discuss-
ing strong and weak discretion); Fletcher, supra note 6. 
190. Armour, supra note 6, at 514. 
191. See Resnick, supra note 140, at 195-214 (discussing the durability of discretion at 
the expense of uniformity). 
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the circumstances of the case are covered by the rule, and a decision 
about remedies.l92 The first stage of determining what rule or standard 
applies has been the subject of formal debate over the past ten years and 
is discussed at length above. Judges in some circumstances have "primary 
discretion," the ability to choose the rules or norms that will apply to 
resolve the issue at hand. 193 Primary discretion takes place when the 
state version of the rules of responsibility does not clearly address the 
issue at hand. In those cases, the rules themselves offer relatively less 
guidance and are not sufficiently clear to significantly constrain the law-
yer's or the judge's judgments. 194 The judge then turns to other norms or 
standards to resolve the issue. 
Even if a court looks to a particular Rule of Conduct, a rule does not, 
and cannot, determine its own weight. 195 With Rules of Professional 
Conduct, this plays out in two forms. First, precedent plays some role in 
interpreting the rules of conduct, but for many issues the court simply 
offers its own understanding of the issue without significantly delving into 
precedent, or relies on federal precedent. The remedy stage offers the 
second example of the indeterminate weight of the ethics rules. As dis-
cussed above, the rules themselves give no remedy, and it is the remedy 
that largely determines the weight of the rule. For remedy purposes, 
other values such as efficiency may have greater weight. 
2. Discretion Through Fact-Finding Process 
Discretion also operates through the judge's fact-finding power. l96 
Fact-finding is a huge burden. Judges have at least two decision-points in 
the factual interpretation stage. The judge can simply refuse to acknowl-
edge the factual issue in any formal fashion. Because attorney conduct 
issues in litigation are usually ancillary to the merits of the underlying 
suit, cognitive theory would predict that judges would allocate their time 
to the primary task of deciding cases. 197 This "parsimonious strategy" to 
192. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 64, at 1192. Alexander and Sherwin use the 
provocative language of rules "lying" to emphasize the ways in which rules do not con-
strain in ways that are implied in the text. See also PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 7, 
at 8 ("The strength of a rule resides not so much in a rule's logical status or linguistic 
meaning as in the conditions surrounding its applicability, acceptance, and enforcement."). 
As Prof. Schauer notes, the distinction between the factual predicate and the consequent 
(what happens if the factual predicate is present) is not always sharp. /d. at 23. 
193. George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 747-48 (1986). 
194. See generally Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 64, at 1217. 
195. Schauer, supra note 2, at 919-20 ("Whether a rule that declares itself nonoverrid-
able or absolute will be treated as such by its addressees, appliers, or interpreters is an 
empirical fact nondeterminable by the rule itself, regardless of the language within the 
rule."). 
196. See John Bell, Discretionary Decision-Making: A Jurisprudential View, in THE 
USES OF DISCRETION 89, 102 (Keith Hawkins, ed. 1992) ("By plotting all the constraints, 
legal and otherwise, within the institutional context, we come to understand the full scope 
of the autonomy which the individual possesses:'). 
197. Hirsch, supra note 181, at 605 ("When courts or other lawmaking bodies have no 
choice but to deal with multiple issues simultaneously, a theory of cognitive jurisprudence 
again anticipates that they will apply themselves unevenly, the Iion's share of attention 
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simply ignore the conduct is a "decision by default, a kind of heuristic."198 
We certainly have reason to think that simply ignoring the issue is a fairly 
common first level response by judges. 199 Lawyers have noted this phe-
nomenon and have complained about judges who ignore perceived 
misconduct.20o 
Alternatively, a judge can acknowledge the issue-essentially tell the 
lawyers to cut it out-but not engage in the fact-finding necessary to es-
tablish an ethics violation. Many ethical issues in litigation turn on "fact 
finding about motive, which is the hardest kind of fact-finding to do."20I 
Finding facts is not a mechanical process; it involves identification and 
allocation of values, all of which take time and energy.z02 As a result, 
there is a tendency to simply tell the lawyers to stop the conduct, but not 
engage in fact-finding necessary to support a sanction. 
3. Discretion to Comment 
Many judges do delve into ethical issues that are raised in the court-
room and take the time to address the issues in reported decisions. Per-
haps the issue was unavoidable, dispositive, involved compelling or 
egregious facts, raised roles issues of importance to the judge or drew an 
emotional response from the judge.203 A judge's personal experience 
with the particular ethical issue may also help explain how the judge re-
going to primary tasks."'); C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARl', POLITICS AND JUDGMENT 
IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 5 (University Press of Kansas 1996) (""At the most simplis-
tic level, the function of U.S. trial judges is to enforce legal norms by resolving individual 
dispu tes.'·). 
198. Hirsch, supra note 181, at 603 (citing Steffen Huck & Jorg Oechssler, Informa-
tional Cascades in {he Laboratory: Do They Occur for the Right Reasons?, 21 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 661 (2000)); Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynam-
ics of Deferred Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 358 (1992). 
199. See Isom, supra note 109. 
200. See, e.g., James A. George, The "Rambo Problem": Is Mandatory CLE {he Way 
Back to A{{icus?, 62 LA. L. REV. 467, 489 (2002). 
201. When asked what his reaction would be when an ethical issue arose. one state 
court judge responded: 
There is no good way to describe what my reaction would be. My first reac-
tion would always be frustration. And the frustration was two-fold. First. 
and primarily I must say, was not an ethical. was not a frustration about eth-
ics. it was a frustration about the activity of the lawyer creating some kind of 
a side issue that I now had to spend time to do fact finding on, or at least deal 
with in some fashion, typically in a form of fact finding, because these typi-
cally were always fact-driven issues. "Did you disclose this stuff, didn't you 
disclose this. If you didn't disclose, why didn't you:' It was a fact bound 
issue, So my first response was, damn it, there is a fact issue here that now is 
a side issue that I have to decide. I've got a million things on my plate; I don't 
need to deal with this. And I frankly don't want to because there is no intel-
lectual content to it. It's all just pure fact finding and not only fact finding 
about activity, but fact finding about motive which is the hardest kind of fact-
finding to do, [02-SB]. 
202, See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 197, at 3. 
203. Hirsch, supra note 181, at 609-11. 
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acts to the issue.204 We can only speculate. 
We know that the written trail left by reported decisions is an incom-
plete picture. As explored in previous work,205 factors such as effi-
ciency,206 judicial collegiality and reputation as a fair-minded judge,207 
concern for the reputation of the lawyer208 or the dignity209 of the lawyer 
might all push a judge to elect not to comment on attorney conduct. 
Some judges presumably have greater tolerance for the adversarial obli-
gation of lawyers.210 The writing process itself might cause the judge's 
204. This is an important empirical question that needs to be studied. Theory would 
suggest that a judge's personal experience shapes a judge's willingness to address an issue. 
See H.W. Perry, DECIDING TO DECIDE 260-63 (1991); Hirsch. supra note 87, at 1362. 
205. See generally McMorrow, Gardina & Ricciardone, supra note 159. 
206. See generally Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 L. & SOC'y REV. 
3 (1997); Zacharias & Green, supra note 62, at 1360 ("Efficient allocation of judicial re-
sources militates in favor of district courts confining themselves to adj udicating questions 
of professional misconduct that can be resolved without resort to an independent fact-
finding mechanism. "). 
207. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) (summarizing theories of influences on judicial 
decision making); In re Voorhees, 739 S.W.2d 178, 187 (Mo. 1987) (without Canon 38(3) 
judges may be tempted to avoid "rocking the boat," but "not every failure to inform about 
well-publicized misbehavior of a fellow judge" is misconduct); Leslie W. Abramson, The 
Judge's Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct By Other Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect On 
Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 779-80 (1997) ("Understandably, what 
judge would want the reputation of a snitch?"). Reputation is a multifaceted subject. a full 
exploration of which is well beyond the scope of this article. Reputation concerns may 
include a desire to avoid controversy if the judge is subject to reelection, a desire for influ-
ence in the legal academy, a desire for influence in the local or state bar, and the like. 
Reputation may have the more genial goal of serving as confirmation that the judge is 
actually a fair-minded and fair-acting arbiter. 
208. Judges may agree with Justice Stevens' factual assessment that "[d]espite the 
changes that have taken place at the bar since I left the active practice 20 years ago, I still 
believe that most lawyers are wise enough to know that their most precious asset is their 
professional reputation." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,413 (1990) (con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). See also SHAPIRO, supra note 152, at 425 (describing 
situation in which lawyer asked for conference concerning a conflict issue; judges' response 
to opposing counsel "You guys have got to be crazy. You're going to have a terrible opin-
ion against you." The attorneys withdrew.). 
As one federal district court judge described, "I think it's potentially a career-ruining 
decision when a judge refers something to a professional conduct committee or institutes 
disciplinary procedures or even names a lawyer in an opinion in which the lawyer is cited 
for a potential ethical violation. So I tend to, to do it very rarely and only if I felt the 
violation was most serious and intentional rather than inadvertent that I would likely con-
sider it an ethical violation." [03-FD]. 
209. One federal district court judge stated that the judge would never publicly embar-
rass a lawyer. To publicly embarrass a lawyer shows "a lack of respect. Respect has to be 
mutual.·' (08-FD). 
210. Two federal judges interviewed about their views of attorney conduct reflect the 
range of tolerance. One federal district court judge stated that "there are circumstances 
where your duty to your client, it seems to me, requires that you approach the border of 
the box-requires it." [04-FD]. 
A federal appeals court judge had a much more critical assessment of the adversarial 
paradigm. After describing the problem as a "disturbing level of distortion of law and fact, 
misdescribing cases, omissions, outright misdescription. It's getting worse at a rate of 
about 5% per year," the judge went on to criticize judges who are too sympathetic of the 
adversarial pressures. "[S]ome of my colleagues resist even criticizing much less imposing 
sanctions under R. 38 of the App Rules. Their argument is that the lawyer is supposed to 
zealously represent the client-if they come close to the zone or a little over, well .... Or 
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temper to cooP I I Appellate judges may need to garner the votes of the 
other judges on the pane1.2l2 While this subject requires much more de-
tailed examination and empirical research, for our purposes it is sufficient 
to note that judges have ample reasons not to comment on a lawyer's 
conduct in written opinions. 
4. Secondary Discretion Through Limited Review 
In the area of attorney conduct, federal judges also have what has been 
termed secondary discretion: the judge's decisions are accorded a pre-
sumption of correctness that will be overturned only if the discretion has 
been abused.213 Many attorney conduct issues are fact bound and 
thereby shielded from significant appellate review.214 This secondary dis-
cretion is particularly strong because appeals courts rarely have an oppor-
tunity to apply even this abuse of discretion standard because of delays in 
appellate review. In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of 
opinions holding that motions to disqualify are not immediately appeala-
ble.215 Since 1985, attorney disqualification issues have received appel-
late review only in the rare circumstances in which a writ of mandamus 
has been issued or the issue has been preserved and reviewed along with 
the appeal on the merits. 
Limiting appellate review to mandamus or those cases that are re-
solved on the merits and then appealed had two interesting effects. First, 
for conflict of interest and advocate-witness issues, appellate analysis 
slowed to a trickle, forcing current courts to refer over and over again to 
older decisions as they analyzed whether disqualification was appropri-
ate. Many of these commonly cited appellate decisions reflect the state of 
legal ethics in the 1970s and early 1980s, using the language of the Model 
Code. The result is what Professor Ronald Rotunda has called the "death 
they say, 'I've seen much worse in other cases' so if we didn't sanction then, we shouldn't 
now." [I-FA] 
211. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 (2003); 
David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 509, 514 (2001) ("An ethical judge must demand of herself that she identify and 
understand her own biases and how they affect her reaction to a case. Writing opinions has 
an important role in this effort. "). 
212. A federal appeals court judge described the dynamic in this way: "Some judges are 
reflexively reluctant to criticize, much less sanction. Some are more aggressive. The real-
ity is that if even one judge resists, no matter how offensive I judge the matter, nothing 
happens. The fact that I or 2 are unenthusiastic about pursuing it effectively exercises a 
veto over action." [I-FA] 
213. Christie, supra note 193, at 749. See generally Bell, supra note 21, at 94. 
214. See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 197, at 3 ("[T]he policy-making power inherent 
in fact-finding maximizes district judges' influence over the authoritative allocation of val-
ues because it is virtually immune from appellate review."). 
215. Richardson-Merrill Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (disqualification in civil 
cases not subject to immediate appeal); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259,260 (1984) 
(disqualification of defense counsel in criminal case not immediately appealable). Simi-
larly, imposition of sanctions against an attorney under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) was not a final 
decision SUbject to appeal. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999) 
("The effective congruence of interests between clients and attorneys counsels against 
treating attorneys like other nonparties for purposes of appeal. "). 
HeinOnline -- 58 S.M.U. L. Rev. 44 2005
44 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
of precedent" in conflicts analysis in federal courtS.216 
This severely limited appellate review also arguably skews the conflicts 
analysis when the rare case does go up on appeal. By the time the case is 
decided on the merits and appealed, a successful motion to disqualify is 
often old news. It takes the unusual case in which the losing party also 
lost the motion to disqualify earlier in the lawsuit.217 Those rare cases 
that preserve and pursue the disqualification of counsel have a huge bur-
den. When reviewing the case, appellate courts appear very reluctant to 
overturn the motion to disqualify, presumably because this raises very 
challenging remedy issues. If the motion to disqualify were erroneously 
granted to the party that lost the litigation below, the make-whole rem-
edy would be to reverse the decision and order a new trial with the dis-
qualified counsel. But absent indication that the merits have been skewed 
by the change in counsel, courts would be imposing huge transaction 
costs by ordering a new trial because of a collateral, seemingly procedural 
issue that did not affect the merits.218 The "affirmance effect"-the fact 
that 80% of all federal civil cases, both published and unpublished, are 
affirmed-gives the original court decision to disqualify (or not) powerful 
momentum.219 
Finally, if the underlying merits of the case have been resolved, appeals 
courts have been reluctant to allow attorneys to appeal from published 
criticism of the lawyer unless there is a formal sanction imposed.220 The 
net effect, again, is to give the trial judge enormous, largely unreviewable, 
discretion. 
5. Natural Resistance to Limiting Discretion 
Judges generally resist efforts to limit their discretion-particularly in 
216. Ronald J. Rotunda, Sister Act: Conflicls of Interest With Sister Corporations, I J. 
INST. STUD. LEGAL Enlles 215, 225 (1996). 
217. As a practical matter, if a motion to disqualify is granted, then substitute counsel is 
now in control. Even if substitute counsel lost on the merits, it is unlikely that they would 
claim that the outcome would have been different with substitute-better-counsel. See 
SHAPIRO, supra note 152, at 420-28 (describing phenomenon of and consequences that flow 
from filing a motion to disqualify). 
218. Collateral damage from motions to disqualify is huge for the losing side as well. 
See Rotunda, supra note 214, at 272 ("The threat of disqualification can impose substantial 
costs on a law firm and the client it represents. It protracts the litigation and increases its 
cost, exerts extra pressure on the client to settle the matter rather than defend a disqualifi-
cation motion or find new legal counsel, and if the lawyers are disqualified, burdens the 
client to find and prepare a new law firm to represent it:') 
219. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 150 (2002). 
220. In many jurisdictions, the criticism of an attorney in a written opinion is not ap-
pealable once the underlying merits have been resolved. See, e.g., In re Williams. 156 F.3d 
86,92 (1st Cir. 1998) ("A jurist's derogatory comments about a lawyer's conduct, without 
more, do not constitute a sanction" and consequently are not appealable.); Clark Equip. 
Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992) ("an attorney may not appeal 
from an order that finds misconduct but does not result in monetary liability, despite the 
potential reputational effects."). Bill see Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831,832 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (attorney may appeal a public reprimand even when no monetary sanctions have 
been imposed). 
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this area of managing the cases that come before them.221 The very 
raison d'etre of federal judges is to exercise discretion. The only way to 
stop them from exercising their inherent function is to strip them of the 
discretionary power. 
The experience under Rule 11 is illustrative. Rule 11 prohibits filing a 
pleading, motion or other paper that is filed for an improper purpose or 
lacks a factual or legal foundation.222 In 1983, Rule 11 was substantially 
strengthened to not just empower, but to command federal judges to 
sanction.223 This turned Rule 11 into a litigation weapon.224 After 10 
years experience under this mandatory Rule, the ludicial Conference 
amended Rule 11 to return significant discretion to judges to impose 
sanctions. The changes offered few guidelines, "creating in effect the ab-
solute right not to sanction. "225 The rule drafting process was unable to 
give more specific content to the rule. ludicial discretion, once again, 
became the preferred method to achieve the underlying goal of limiting 
frivolous litigation. 
In some respects, it perhaps shows disrespect for judges to attempt to 
constrain their discretion too much, especially in areas involving what is 
fairly characterized as controlling the proceeding before them. It de-
means the very quality that one seeks in the judge. On the other hand, 
lawyers have a deep interest in having notice of the standards that will be 
applied to them. 
6. Problems With Discretion 
Of course, there can be problems with judicial discretion. Abuse of 
discretion is the typical standard for reviewing trial court imposition of 
sanctions for attorney misconduct.226 We do not have evidence that this 
discretion is systematically abused. But because of the absence of appel-
late review, we also do not have evidence that the discretion is wisely 
used. 
We know that discretion always carries with it the possibility of abuse. 
The broad discretion for attorney conduct issues understandably scares 
the 001. They want to eliminate the possibility of abuse-from their 
perspective. The 001 has been successful in whittling away at judicial 
221. See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and 
When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 238 (1997) (Federal trial judges "do not react weIl to rules 
that limit their discretion."); Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Challging Rules: Judicial 
and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice. and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. 
REV. 133, 199-200 (1997) (Federal trial judges are "strongly attached to their own individ-
ual authority" to manage cases.). 
222. FED. R. CIv. P. 11. 
223. Brown, S/Ipra note 98, at 1566-67; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and 
Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (1991). 
224. Brown, supra note 98, at 1567-69. 
225. Armour, supra note 6, at 507. 
226, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,55 (1991) (applying abuse of discretion 
standard in reviewing District Court's sanction under inherent powers); Cooter & GeIl v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (using abuse of discretion standard when review-
ing Rule II sanctions). 
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discretion in a few key areas, such as successfully convincing the First 
Circuit that the district court exceeded its rulemaking authority to the 
extent that the local rules incorporate a state rule limiting subpoenas on 
defense counsel in the grand jury context.227 The DOJ has gone to states 
with ethics interpretations that impair DOJ activities and has had at least 
one success in getting the state to change the ethics rule.228 Discretion 
can be curbed on the edges by strategic attacks. 
Some might be concerned about this generally broad discretion be-
cause political ideology can playa role in decision-making. But the im-
pact of ideology on a judge's view of attorney conduct is not obvious.229 
Critical legal studies critiques of preferences for the existing power struc-
ture do not necessarily assist us in analyzing the allocation of discretion in 
regulating attorney conduct in federal court practice. The impact of race 
and gender may be evident in individual cases, but it is again unclear 
what role it has in determining the allocation of power in this area. Law 
and economics offer the more obvious assistance by giving analytical sup-
port for the idea that judges will naturally align themselves with ap-
proaches that give them maximum flexibility to advance individual or 
institutional efficiency. 
Lawyers presumably want to be free from the uncertainty of unpredict-
able outcomes. We understand intuitively, and more recently from em-
pirical data, that judges are not immune from many of the cognitive 
biases that affect other mere mortals.230 Judges are prone to hindsight 
bias: after the bad consequences have occurred, people may overestimate 
the predictability of the bad event.231 But most judges were also practic-
ing attorneys, which presumably would give them greater empathy for the 
lawyer's task.232 There is some reason to think that greater empathy still 
may not minimize the gaps in perceptions. Judges are prone to egocentric 
biases, such as overestimating their abilities in comparison to others.233 
For example, in Prof. Theodore Eisenberg's study of bankruptcy judges 
and lawyers, "[e]ach group tends to overstate the merits of its profes-
sional performance compared to the other group's perception of that per-
formance."234 For example, judges viewed themselves as fine-tuning 
227. Stern v. United States Dist. Ct., 214 F.3d 4, 21 (1st CiT. 2000) (local rule requiring 
judicial preapproval of subpoenas to defense counsel is not applicable to federal prosecu-
tors because it interferes with federal grand jury system). 
228. Peter Wong, Court OKs Exception to Lawyers' Deceit Rule, STATESMAN JOURNAL 
(Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://www.avoiceforchildren.com/documentsllie_cheat_steall 
OREGON %20STATE %20BAR%20NOW%20LEGALLY%20DECEIDFUL.htm. See 
also Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Relig-
iOlls Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1273 (2004). 
229. Legal realists broke the story on this subject. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Tran-
scendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 846 (1935). 
230. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey 1. Rachlinski & Andrew 1. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
231. Id. at 799-805. 
232. Levels of empathy are an interesting research question. 
233. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 230, at 811-16. 
234. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceplions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 
72 WASil. u. L.Q. 979, 981 (1994). 
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compensation more than lawyers perceive this occurring.235 On the flip 
side, lawyers perceived themselves as complying with fee guidelines far 
more than judges perceive compliance.236 And many decisions about at-
torney conduct in litigation are made "under uncertain, time-pressured 
conditions" that may "encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that 
sometimes cause illusions of judgment. "237 One path to minimizing such 
heuristics is through "increased attention and greater deliberation "-the 
very commodity that judges are carefully marshalling and jealously 
guarding.238 We must be cautious, however, about overemphasizing 
these heuristics, or the public policy implications derived therefrom.239 
Because we do not have evidence of systematic abuse of discretion-or 
intolerable levels of cognitive bias-it is quite understandable that courts 
perceive that the benefits of discretion outweigh the risks. Once again, 
all systems push toward flexibility for judges in addressing attorney 
conduct. 
C. No EASY CURE FOR THIS PROBLEM 
Lawyers are left with the challenge of anticipating how a federal court 
will react to a particular ethical dilemma. There will be no easy cure for 
the challenge inherent in a federal system. The analysis above demon-
strates that even if federal courts consistently use state rules of conduct 
(vertical uniformity), there are multiple steps in the decision-making pro-
cess that incorporate significant judicial discretion. At heart, these inter-
pretive differences will arise because the norm creators in this context 
(the state supreme courts) are not the norm enforcers. Federal judges are 
one step removed from the rules and have a long history of articulating 
the values behind the rules as applied in their courtroom. 
Even if federal courts create targeted uniform rules to address recur-
ring issues in federal court practice (horizontal uniformity), the inherent 
limit of rules and the absence of appellate review means it is unlikely that 
235. Id. at 985. 
236. Id. at 987; see also Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything YOIl Think: Cognitive 
Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003) (analyzing lawyer and client 
perceptions ). 
237. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Sl/pra note 230, at 783. 
238. Id. at 819-820 ("[ e Jven with greater resources, judges will still resort to cognitive 
shortcuts."). Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich advocate three methods to minimize heuris-
tics: adopting multiple perspectives when making decisions. limiting heuristics to circum-
stances in which they are most appropriately used, and reducing reliance on judgments that 
are particularly prone to distortion. Id. at 822-25. 
One method to temper egocentric bias is to provide mUltiple judicial appeals. Id. at 828-
29. When a judge criticizes an attorney in a written opinion (i.e. shames the lawyer), but 
imposes no additional sanction, that written criticism is alone not subject to appeal, taking 
away one technique to check this egocentric bias. III re Williams, 156 F.3d 86 (lst Cir. 
1998). 
239. Cf Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision Theory in the COllrl of Public Law, 87 
COI~NELL L. REV. 671 (2002). In particular, ··the literature has had relatively little to say 
about the role of institutional mechanisms that may buffer or even neutralize defective 
heuristics that can dominate individual decisionmaking." {d. at 671-72. 
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there will be a national body of case law to give meaning to rules that 
might be adopted. 
What has emerged is a delicate, ongoing balance of competing interests 
that is driven by a minimal encroachment approach that acknowledges 
the state supreme courts' strong interest, but gives room for the auton-
omy interests of the federal courts. This is an acceptable policy result, not 
because the current situation is good, but because the alternatives will not 
be better and might make the situation worse. 
Very targeted and selective drafting of specific rules to address com-
monly-occurring situations may offer some modest help. But the situa-
tions amenable to precise rules are also situations that might better be 
addressed in the rules of procedure. For example, there may be value in 
setting out in a text how lawyers should proceed when there is accidental 
disclosure of privileged information, the limits of prosecutorial contact 
with represented persons during investigations, and the specific require-
ments for subpoenas on defense counsel. The fact that these are recur-
ring situations and are woven into the underlying procedural 
requirements suggests that these issues may be better addressed under 
the rules of civil or criminal procedure.240 
IV. THE UTILITY OF RULES: MINIMAL 
ENCROACHMENT APPROACH 
So far, federal courts have been unable to develop a rule-based resolu-
tion to the issue of which rules should govern attorney conduct in federal 
court practice. The effort to create rules of attorney conduct in federal 
court practice, while likely to be futile, has had some important positive 
effects. While the Rules of Professional Conduct are not as deeply en-
trenched in federal courts as they are in the state regulatory apparatus, 
this does not mean that the rules are without value. Rules foster "pre-
dictability, reliability, and certainty," but to varying degrees.24l The very 
fact that the issue was raised might have been the impetus for a few dis-
trict courts embracing a local rule of dynamic conformity. That advances 
the goal of predictability (at the expense of the highest level of consis-
tency for those with a national practice). 
Over the past ten years, this debate has also sharpened our understand-
ing of the role of federal courts in developing litigation ethics. Rules are 
a device for allocating power.242 Representatives from the Conference of 
State Chief Justices have been involved in the federal courts' analysis of 
this issue and have been clear about their preference for a minimal en-
croachment approach by federal courts. The rich scholarly discussion has 
240. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: COllrt Rulemakillg. 
Democralic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999). 
24 L. PLAYING By THE RULES, supra note 7, at 98, 102. 
242. PLAYING By THE RULES, supra note 7, at 98 ("If rules function in the service of a 
division of responsibility among agents or institutions, if they service jurisdiction-appor-
tioning roles, then rule-based decision-making can patrol the houndaries between jurisdic-
tions in a way that no other decision-making procedure can."). 
HeinOnline -- 58 S.M.U. L. Rev. 49 2005
2005] The (F) Utility of Rules 49 
sharpened our understanding of the role of judges In shaping ethical 
norms. 
The debate over what attorney conduct rules apply has also sharpened 
our understanding of the field of litigation ethics. The early Rules Com-
mittee study revealed that conflict of interest, contact with represented 
persons and advocate as witness are the three most litigated ethics issues 
in federal court practice. By putting these issues on the radar screen, 
courts may become a bit more thoughtful about the policy differences 
and choices. 
The failed effort to create uniform rules has also encouraged dialogue. 
The McDade Amendment and the power of national rule-making have 
forced the DOJ to the negotiating table with certain states. The DOl's 
multiple efforts to make an end run around the issues by going directly to 
Congress have been unsuccessful because of the amazing and shifting val-
ues this issue raises. 
This process is also causing some to rethink the role of the American 
Bar Association in promulgating rules of conduct. Andrew Kaufman has 
been using this process to argue that the ABA's dominant role in crafting 
standards of professional conduct is no longer appropriate and that the 
power of rule-making should be centered in the Conference of Chief Jus-
tices and the Judicial Conference, with the ABA functioning in an advi-
sory capacity.243 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is no secret that we have multiple strains on our state-based system 
of attorney regulation. The debate over rules of conduct for federal court 
practice has helped us understand the limited and focused interest of fed-
eral courts. 
Although federal courts are unlikely to create comprehensive rules of 
conduct, they may yet develop a handful of rules. Even without a few 
focused rules, we recognize that the grip of the states has loosened. 
States are one important actor in the law governing lawyers. They are not 
the only actor, however. In federal litigation, the federal courts inevita-
bly will be the dominant actor in determining the norms, the remedy and 
the role that federal courts are willing to assume in the mosaic of attorney 
regulation. 
It is appropriate to end this article with a critical caveat. This analysis 
is based on inferences from the failed effort to create at least some uni-
form rules of attorney conduct applicable to federal court practice. This 
analysis, unfortunately, is informed largely by anecdotal evidence about 
judges' concerns. We know relatively little about litigation realities, and 
even less about the systemic patterns of how judges deal with issues of 
attorney conduct.244 We have much more to learn. 
243. Kaufman, slIpra note 75, at I. 
244. See Clermont & Eisenberg, mpra note 217, at 148 ("'A major point of this Article 
is that all of us know very little about litigation realities. The realm of unknowns is vast."). 
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